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Notes 
SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST:  FEDERAL LAW 
V. STATE LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF 
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A land ethic for tomorrow should be as honest as Thoreau’s Walden, and as 
comprehensive as the sensitive science of ecology.  It should stress the oneness of 
our resources and the live-and-help-live logic of the great chain of life.1 
 
Assume that in order to attract industry and build a more robust 
economy, State X, in 1998, enacted lenient laws dealing with successor 
liability in corporate liability cases.  Now assume that in 1960, John 
Smith, a chemist, chose to start a hazardous chemical manufacturing 
plant in State X and that Mr. Smith incorporated his business under the 
laws of State X.  Due to an increased industrial interest in chemical 
research in the 1990s, Mr. Smith’s company had enough business in State 
Y that he built a second facility there in 1992, also manufacturing 
hazardous chemicals.  State Y has more stringent corporate liability laws 
than State X.  Unbeknownst to Mr. Smith and his managers, a large 
amount of hazardous residue accumulated in both of his facilities and 
leaked into the soil beneath his hazardous chemical manufacturing 
plants. 
In 2004, following a large corporate buyout in 2000 under the laws of 
State Y, Mr. Smith sold his facilities, all assets of the company, and the 
patents to processing the chemicals to E Corp., a company incorporated 
under the laws of State Y.  E Corp. then decided to relocate the chemical 
facilities and build apartments on both facilities’ sites.  In 2005, Mr. Smith 
died.  Pursuant to the proposed change in the use of land from industrial 
to residential, the bank from which E Corp. sought to obtain a loan 
demanded that E Corp. perform Phase I and Phase II Environmental 
Assessments of the property.  As can be imagined, groundwater tests 
indicated that the water had been contaminated from the accumulated 
residue in both facilities.  Pursuant to federal regulation, the 
environmental consultants reported the contamination to the 
appropriate agencies.  Following the government’s clean-up of the sites 
in both States X and Y, they now seek reimbursement from E Corp. as a 
                                                 
1 STEWART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS 190 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1963). 
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successor corporation to Smith.  E Corp. denies that it is a successor in 
interest to Mr. Smith’s facilities, and the government sues in federal 
court seeking to enforce the repayment of clean-up costs.  The federal 
court is now faced with the question of whether to apply federal or state 
law in the case, and if state law is chosen, whether to apply the law of 
State X or of State Y.2 
Foremost among the issues for E Corp. is determining whether it is a 
liable party in Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) violations; this is more commonly 
referred to as the issue of successor liability.3  Federal circuits are split as 
to whether to apply state law or federal law in resolving the issue.4  
Therefore, the purpose of this Note is to explore various arguments 
promoting the application of state law and promoting the application of 
federal common law, and to advocate the creation and adoption of a 
uniform federal rule to resolve the issue of successor liability.  Part II of 
this Note outlines the background of the statute and the circuit split 
regarding which law should govern.5  Part III analyzes two different 
approaches circuits have taken to resolve the issue—the application of 
state law and the application of federally developed common law.6  Part 
IV proposes three different methods by which the issue of successor 
liability could potentially be addressed:  a statutory amendment to 
CERCLA, statutory construction by the Supreme Court to define the 
meaning of “successor corporation,” or the Court’s creation of federal 
common law to define how a successor corporation is to be determined 
for purposes of liability.7 
                                                 
2 The foregoing hypothetical is entirely the creation of the author and completely 
fictional.  Any resemblance of this hypothetical to real persons, entities, or facts is purely 
coincidental. 
3 Jay W. Warren, Comment, The Choice of Law Issue for Corporate Successor Liability Under 
CERCLA in N. Shore Gas Co. v. Salmon, Inc.:  Another Opinion Sidesteps the Issue, 16 J. NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 321 (2001–02); see also infra Part II.A (discussing the issue of 
determining who is a liable party under CERCLA). 
4 See infra Parts II.B–E (discussing the circuit split and various arguments for 
application of state law and federal law). 
5 See infra Part II (discussing how the hasty formulation of CERCLA has led to litigation 
concerning how a successor corporation is to be determined for purposes of liability under 
CERCLA, and also explaining the opposing approaches circuits have applied in seeking to 
resolve the issue). 
6 See infra Part III (analyzing the superiority and utility of applying federal common law 
to the less useful approach of applying state law to resolve issues of successor liability). 
7 See infra Part IV (suggesting one of three approaches to resolve the issue, and 
discussing why the creation of federal common law is the most likely way to resolve the 
problem). 
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II.  BACKGROUND OF STATUTORY, JUDICIAL, AND SCHOLARLY RESPONSES TO 
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
In the 1960s and 1970s, many acts of legislation were passed in order 
to combat the burgeoning concern over the danger to human health and 
the environment caused by hazardous pollutants.8  Some of these acts 
included the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) of 1976.9  RCRA created what 
has been called a “cradle-to-grave” system for facilitating the use of 
hazardous substances in society—from the time of their introduction to 
their disposal.10  Through RCRA, Congress had resolved concerns 
regarding the life cycle of hazardous substances.11  However, following 
RCRA’s enactment, a new concern came to Congress’s attention—the 
“inactive hazardous waste site problem.”12 
                                                 
8 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6120. 
9 Id.  See also DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
528, 648, 788 (Thomson West 2006) (1981).  Beginning in 1955, the federal government 
began to regulate air pollution through the Air Pollution Control Act.  Id. at 529.  This 
legislation largely tried to help states curb air pollution by providing research and technical 
support in addition to financial aid.  Id.  Due to this legislation’s ineffectiveness, Congress 
enacted the Clean Air Act in 1970, which sought to curb pollution through setting National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards for the states.  Id.  The states were then required to achieve 
the air quality standards by a statutory deadline.  Id.   
 The federal government sought to regulate water pollution as early as 1899; however, 
the government played only a minor role until after World War II.  Id. at 646.  Despite 
efforts to further police water pollution throughout the 1950s and 1960s, water pollution 
continued.  Id.  During this time, the public’s awareness of water pollution’s danger began 
to grow.  Id. at 646–47.  Finally, in 1972, Congress amended its previous water quality 
statutes and renamed the legislation the Clean Water Act.  Congress’s new policing 
mechanism to control water quality included a national permit system for all “point 
sources” of water pollution and sanctions for those that have no permit, as well as those 
permit holders who do not achieve mandated water quality standards.  Id. at 648.  In 
creating RCRA, Congress amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act, which was first enacted 
in 1965, to regulate landfills and dumps.  Id. at 788.  RCRA was established as Congress 
became more aware of toxic substances that were leaching into the groundwater, 
subsequently causing threats to human health and the environment.  Id. 
10 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17; see also FARBER ET AL., supra note 9, at 790 (“RCRA is 
designed to provide ‘cradle to grave’ coverage for a large percentage of the hazardous 
waste generated by businesses and government.  The statute covers approximately 30 
million tons of hazardous wastes generated annually by more than 17,000 generators.”). 
11 See id. (“RCRA’s overarching theory is that if we know where the waste is during its 
life cycle—from the moment of generation through transport to a disposal site, to its 
ultimate treatment, storage and disposal—then we can avoid the kinds of catastrophes at 
which CERCLA is aimed.”). 
12 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17; see also FARBER ET AL., supra note 9, at 788.  The authors 
explained the growing issue as follows: 
 Not long after RCRA’s passage, the issue of hazardous waste 
contamination made national headlines.  In August 1978, President 
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In 1979, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) determined 
that between 30,000 and 50,000 inactive and uncontrolled hazardous 
substance waste sites existed.13  This “inactive and hazardous waste site 
problem[]” was evident throughout the United States with 1,200–2,000 
                                                                                                             
Carter declared a state of emergency in the Love Canal area of Niagara 
Falls, New York.  Investigating serious health complaints by residents, 
the state health department found that toxic chemicals had leaked into 
the basements of many houses, and into the air, water, and soil. . . . In 
1947, Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporations had purchased an 
uncompleted waterway and used it as a depository for an estimated 
352 million pounds of industrial wastes over the following six years.  
The land had then been used as a school site and a housing 
development.  As a result, three decades later, over 1000 families were 
evacuated, $30 million in cleanup costs were required, and over $3 
billion in damage claims were filed.  
 Love Canal was not an isolated incident.  In the past, land was 
regarded as a “safe” repository for wastes that could not be disposed 
of in the air or water.  Decades of uncontrolled dumping have led to 
contamination of land and of related ground and surface waters. 
Id. at 788–89 (footnote omitted).  An even greater problem that began to gain recognition 
was that water traveling through these sites could carry chemicals into the groundwater, 
thereby contaminating streams, rivers, and other sources of water.  Id. at 788.  The Love 
Canal incident created an increased urgency in Congress to pass CERCLA.  Id. 
13 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 18 (explaining that “findings of the Committee’s Oversight 
Subcommittee clearly and unequivocally document the nature and magnitude of the 
problem and the inadequacy of existing law to properly control it.”).  The House Report 
then went on to report an illustrative list of findings that the Committee considered in 
creating the proposed Act.  Under CERCLA, “hazardous substance” is defined as: 
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 
33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance 
designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous 
waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to 
section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act . . .  (D) any toxic 
pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air 
pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or 
mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action 
pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include 
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not 
otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance 
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term 
does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, 
or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such 
synthetic gas). 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2000).  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the statute 
to include any hazardous substance, and the statute does not have specific quantitative 
requirements, but includes even minimal amounts of pollution.  United States v. Alcan 
Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 720 (2nd Cir. 1993). 
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sites recognized as posing serious public health risks.14  In addition to the 
presence of sites with heightened risk, the problem also included 
inadequate measures by local and state governments to combat public 
health threats.15  Furthermore, some of the hazardous waste sites had 
already contaminated drinking water supplies, thereby damaging 
human health and the environment; indeed, this contamination caused 
great public concern.16 
In response, the public became more curious and concerned about 
past disposal of hazardous waste that had created present consequences.17  
Thus, while RCRA was primarily forward-looking in its scope, Congress 
sought to enact backward-looking legislation that addressed problems 
created by the past disposal of hazardous substances.18  Consequently, 
Congress drafted CERCLA.19  Unfortunately, in their eagerness to pass a 
                                                 
14 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17, 20, 25 (explaining that the failure of entities to dispose 
properly of hazardous waste is costing the public millions of dollars in clean-up and that 
the danger to the environment and the public health is substantial); Ronald G. Aronovsky 
& Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Substance Releases Under 
CERCLA, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 421, 425 (1990) (explaining that abandoned hazardous waste 
sites had already damaged the environment and human health); see also 126 CONG. REC. 
H31,968 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio) (“It should be made clear that 
without this legislation there is a huge legislative void that exists.  There is no authority.  
There is no funding to deal with certain types of hazardous waste spills and hazardous 
waste dangers to health and to the environment.”) (emphasis added). 
15 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 18–19 for a list of specific examples that posed a 
significant threat to public health.  The following are just three of the examples included in 
the House report:  
 At Lathrop, California, pesticide formulation waste products 
placed in lagoons were allowed to percolate into the extremely 
permeable soil, threatening the area’s drinking and irrigation water. 
 . . . In Central Florida, hundreds of homes were built on land covered 
with waste containing radium and thorium from old phosphate 
operations; unhealthy levels of radon gas have been found in 
hundreds of homes. . . .  
 . . . .  
The New York State Health Department has failed to assure residents 
of the Love Canal that the public health is being adequately protected. 
Id. at 19–20. 
16 See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 425 (explaining that CERCLA was passed as 
a result of numerous widely publicized discoveries of abandoned hazardous waste sites). 
17 Id. at 17–18.  (“The unfortunate human health and environmental consequence of 
these practices has received national attention amidst growing public and Congressional 
concern over the magnitude of the problem and the appropriate course of response that 
should be pursued.  Existing law is clearly inadequate to deal with this massive problem.”). 
18 Id. 
19 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 1, 17; see also 126 CONG. REC. H31,968 (statement of Rep. 
Florio) (“The overriding majority of the people in this House who passed it and the people 
who passed it in the other body were responding to the pressure from this Nation to 
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law that would address the hazardous waste site problem, members of 
Congress drafted a law with numerous statutory deficiencies recognized 
by both those members of Congress in favor of the legislation and those 
who opposed it.20  As a result of the hasty enactment of CERCLA, a 
multitude of courts has spent countless resources seeking to resolve 
issues in the Act.21 
This Part begins with a discussion of CERCLA’s legislative history in 
Part II.A, including a discussion of the Act’s basic purposes and 
Congress’s intent in enacting it.22  Part II.B examines the authority 
                                                                                                             
provide for a remedial action for the problem of abandoned hazardous waste sites and 
chemical spills.”). 
20 In the House debate concerning CERCLA’s passage, many representatives strongly 
supported it despite its recognized flaws, and many strongly opposed its enactment.  
Compare id. at H31,968-69 (statement of Rep. Florio): 
Let me just conclude by giving to you my impression that this is a 
good bill and those of us who overwhelmingly supported this bill 
when it came before the House can be happy to support it 
now. . . . There will be those who say that the bill is not perfect.  Of 
course it is not.  There will be those who say that we could do more 
and we could[] . . . .  The time is now to deal with this problem. . . . The 
concern is whether we are going to have legislation . . . .  Accordingly, I 
would ask for your support for this bill . . .  so that we can have this 
bill sent to the President and have it signed into law. 
with id. at H31,971 (statement of Rep. Madigan) (emphasis added): 
[T]here are some very serious flaws in this bill as passed by the Senate.  
It would have made much more sense for me to take the time to correct 
technical errors and to address a few of the policy concerns that are 
shared by Members of the House . . . .  However, that was not the 
course of action chosen by my chairman, the chairman of my 
subcommittee . . . .  We have been left at a take-it-or-leave it situation 
and I rise to recommend to the House that we leave it. 
and id. at H31,969 (statement of Rep. Broyhill): 
I . . . urge the House to defeat this motion to suspend the rules and to 
pass this legislation.  . . . it seems to me that we are being asked here to 
pass a bill that has dozens of defects in it when all we would have to 
do is to add reasonable amendments and send that back to the other 
body and have them pass a bill that will be administratively workable. 
 . . . I have in my hand a three-page list of various defects and technical 
errors that are in this bill . . . . Here is a list of serious and technical 
problems with this bill.  . . .  Inadequate drafting.—This bill was 
hurriedly drafted without the use of legislative counsel and as [a] 
result contains a large but unknown number of drafting errors. 
Id. 
21 Warren, supra note 3, at 321 (“Numerous issues in the Act have spawned litigation 
since its passage, but none, perhaps, as crucial as the determination of exactly who should 
be held liable for CERCLA violations.  Despite its comprehensive nature, CERCLA fails to 
expressly address the liability of successor parent corporations for violations of 
subsidiaries.”). 
22 See infra Part II.A (discussing Congress’s intent for enacting the CERCLA and some of 
the Act’s deficiencies noted by Congress). 
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delegated to the EPA under the Act to determine responsible parties and 
steps necessary to clean up hazardous waste sites.23  This Part also 
focuses on factors the Supreme Court has fashioned to help determine 
when it is appropriate to draft federal common law.24  Part II.C 
introduces CERCLA’s deficiency that is at issue in this Note—the issue 
of successor liability—and discusses different approaches state and 
federal courts have used to resolve the problem.25  Finally, Parts II.D and 
II.E present the circuit split that now plagues the federal circuits, 
specifically whether state or federal law should govern when defining a 
successor corporation for purposes of liability under CERCLA.26 
A. Hasty Statutory Formulation for an Extensive Problem:  CERCLA 
CERCLA, also known as Superfund,27 was hastily enacted in 1980, 
was signed into law at the end of the Carter administration,28 and had 
essentially two purposes:  1) to enable the EPA’s Administrator to 
pursue prompt recovery costs from parties financially responsible and 
liable for clean-up activities and 2) to identify and remediate 
contaminated sites.29  To meet these objectives, Congress created 
                                                 
23 See infra Part II.C (examining the responsibilities of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) under CERCLA and the public’s criticisms of CERCLA). 
24 See infra Part II.D (focusing on the authority of courts to draft federal common law and 
on factors created by the Supreme Court to help determine when federal common law is 
necessary and appropriate). 
25 See infra Part II.B (introducing the issue of successor liability and the “mere 
continuation” and “substantial continuity” tests). 
26 See infra Parts II.D–II.E (presenting opposing arguments among the federal circuits as 
to whether state law should govern the issue of successor liability, or whether federal 
courts should create federal common law to resolve the issue). 
27 JOHN S. APPLEGATE & JAN G. LAITOS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:  RCRA, CERCLA, AND 
THE MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 133 (Foundation Press 2006).  Superfund is a 
trust fund that receives funding from excise taxes on companies like chemical and 
petroleum industries.  Id.  The money in Superfund is used to finance clean-up activities of 
non-liable private parties.  Id.  To help determine which sites can access Superfund money 
under CERCLA, the EPA creates a list of the worst hazardous waste sites in the nation, and 
the EPA places these sites on a National Priorities List.  Id.  Through this list and other 
methods, the EPA can determine what corrective actions need to be taken to clean up 
hazardous waste sites, and the EPA is able to decide how the government and private 
parties can recover the costs of the clean-up.  Id. at 134. 
28 MICHAEL B. GERRARD & JOEL M. GROSS, AMENDING CERCLA:  THE POST-SARA 
AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND 
LIABILITY ACT 1 (2006). 
29 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6120; see, e.g., 
Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 421 (“In 1980, CONGRESS ENACTED [CERCLA] as a 
hurried measure to address the emerging problem associated with the cost of cleaning up 
the nation’s hundreds of leaking hazardous waste disposal sites.”) (footnote omitted); see 
also Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991); 
APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 27, at 129 (“CERCLA is not a traditional regulatory statute 
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defenses against liability that may be used only in rare circumstances.30  
Moreover, courts have also interpreted liability under CERCLA as strict, 
joint and several, and retroactive.31 
CERCLA’s liability provisions apply to four different categories of 
“[c]overed” parties:  1) current owners or operators of a facility; 2) past 
owners who owned or operated a hazardous site at the time the 
hazardous waste was disposed of; 3) any person who arranged for 
hazardous waste disposal, treatment, or transport of waste to a facility 
operated by another party; and 4) any person who accepted hazardous 
waste for transport to disposal or treatment facilities.32  The operative 
word for imposing liability is “person[,]” and Congress defined person 
to include, inter alia, an individual, corporation, or association.33  More 
                                                                                                             
like the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air 
Act.  It is a remediation statute designed to impose liability for past conduct with present 
effects.”). 
In 1980, CERCLA was enacted in response to the serious 
environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution.  . . . “As 
its name implies, CERCLA is a comprehensive statute that grants the 
President broad power to command government agencies and private 
parties to clean up hazardous waste sites.”  . . . If it satisfies certain 
statutory conditions, the United States may, for instance, use the 
“Hazardous Substance Superfund” to finance cleanup 
efforts[.] . . . “CERCLA . . . imposes the costs of the cleanup on those 
responsible for the contamination.”  . . .  “The remedy that Congress 
felt it needed in CERCLA is sweeping:  everyone who is potentially 
responsible for hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to 
contribute to the costs of cleanup.” 
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55, 56 n.1 (1998) (citations omitted). 
30 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000).  CERCLA states: 
There shall be no liability . . . for a person otherwise liable who can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat 
of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting 
therefrom were caused solely by--(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; 
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent 
of the defendant[.] . . .  
Id. 
31 See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1988); 
see also APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 27, at 130. 
32 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)1–4.  See David E. Dopf, Federal Common Law or State Law?:  The 
Ninth Circuit Takes on Successor Liability Under CERCLA in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 171, 173–75 (1999); David C. Clarke, 
Successor Liability Under CERCLA:  A Federal Common Law Approach, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1300, 1305 (1990) (explaining that these categories “and the statute’s legislative history[] 
indicate Congress’s intent to cast a broad net of liability across all parties associated with 
hazardous sites[.]”) (footnote omitted). 
33 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2005).  See Smith Land & Improvement, 851 F.2d at 91, which 
quoted Blackstone in describing the long-lasting vitality of a corporation: 
[A]ll the individual members that have existed from the foundation to 
the present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person in 
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specifically, although CERCLA fails to include “successor corporation[]” 
in the definition of a “person[,]” courts have interpreted “corporation” to 
include successor corporations.34  This interpretation reflects Congress’s 
intent to impose liability and prevent corporations from evading liability 
simply by selling a corporation or merging with another corporation.35  
Unfortunately, however, while congressional intent to prevent entities 
from evading liability is clear, its statutory creation, CERCLA, is less 
clear on how liable parties should be determined in some instances.36 
B. Liability and Steps for Remediation and the Kimbell Factors 
In determining liability and steps for remediation, Congress allows 
the EPA to force responsible parties to contribute in remedial and clean-
up activities either by ordering liable parties to directly clean up a site 
under section 106 of CERCLA, or to initiate remedial actions and then 
sue liable parties to recover costs.37  Unfortunately, this authority does 
                                                                                                             
law, a person that never dies; in like manner as the river Thames is still 
the same river, though the parts which compose it are changing every 
instant. 
Id.  The court explained that a corporation remains a distinct and separate entity from its 
shareholders, and therefore, changes in stock ownership do not affect the rights and 
obligations of the corporation as an individual entity.  Id. 
34 See Anspec Co., Inc., 922 F.2d at 1245 (stating that “when Congress wrote ‘corporation’ 
in CERCLA it intended to include a successor corporation”). 
35 See Dopf, supra note 32, at 176.  See also Philip G. Watson, Note, United States v. 
General Battery Corp.:  The Third Circuit Applies Federal Common Law Rather than State Law to 
Determine Successor Liability Under CERCLA, Despite Opposing Results in Other Circuits—But 
Are the Splitting Circuits Just Splitting Hairs?, 20 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 219, 221 (2006): 
CERCLA has incorporated successor liability by implication.  . . . Thus, 
“CERCLA incorporates common law principles of indirect liability, 
including successor liability.”  This implicit recognition has led the 
circuit courts to hold unanimously that successor liability exists under 
CERCLA.  Unanimity was predictable, considering that corporate 
successor liability is a long-standing concept that existed at common 
law. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
36 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 3, at 321 (“Numerous issues in the Act have spawned 
litigation since its passage, but none, perhaps, as crucial as the determination of exactly 
who should be held liable for CERCLA violations.”). 
37 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55, 56 & n.1 (1998).  The Court provides the 
following explanation: 
“CERCLA is a comprehensive statute that grants the President broad 
power to command government agencies and private parties to clean 
up hazardous waste sites.”  If it satisfies certain statutory conditions, 
the United States may, for instance, use the “Hazardous Substance 
Superfund” to finance cleanup efforts[.] . . . “[E]veryone who is 
potentially responsible for hazardous-waste contamination may be 
forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup.” 
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not always result in the clear identification of liable individuals, and 
courts are again left with the choice of which law to apply to determine 
whether the party is truly liable.38  Part II.B.1 begins with a further 
discussion of CERCLA’s attempt to create provisions for remediation, 
and Part II.B.2 finishes with the Supreme Court’s discussion of factors to 
consider when deciding whether to create federal common law.39 
1. CERCLA’s Attempt at Remediation 
In the wake of CERCLA’s enactment, commentators criticized 
CERCLA for its unfairness to potentially liable landowners who had 
little or nothing to do with contamination but could still be sued by the 
government for clean-up costs.40  Additionally, the environmental 
community began to complain that the EPA was desperately failing to 
implement Superfund’s enforcement measures.41  In response to these 
criticisms, Congress addressed a number of issues by reauthorizing 
CERCLA in 1986 by enacting the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act.42 
                                                                                                             
Id. (citation omitted); see also Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 426.  The authors explain 
as follows: 
By enacting these broad liability provisions, Congress gave the EPA 
considerable latitude to shift the costs of remedial actions from the 
public to private responsible parties.  It also ushered in an era of 
aggressive litigation between the government and responsible parties 
over the scope of many of CERCLA’s provisions and the meaning of its 
terms. 
Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 426. 
38 See Pia Dias, Note, Raytheon Constructors, Inc. v. Asarco Inc.:  The Tenth Circuit Finds a 
Successor in Interest Not Liable for the Cleanup Costs of a Mine Site Under CERCLA . . . But What 
About State Corporate Law?, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 219, 221 (2004) (explaining that liability is 
determined based on four categories outlined in section 107(a) of CERCLA and that these 
categories have “ignited thousands of lawsuits”). 
39 See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing the enduring criticisms of CERCLA’s inability to 
provide adequate provisions for determining responsible parties and factors that courts are 
to consider when deciding whether to fashion federal common law). 
40 GERRARD & GROSS, supra note 28, at 1.  The authors cite the following as one 
hypothetical example of unfairness:  “a party that had complied with the law and sent a 
single drum of waste to a site could be sued by the government for the entire cost of site 
cleanup, often in the millions or tens of millions of dollars.”  Id. 
41 Id.  Complaints—from both the environmental community and Congress—accused 
the EPA of failing to adequately enforce Superfund, and of entering into “sweetheart 
deals” that did not promulgate the purpose of Superfund with respect to potentially liable 
parties.  Id. 
42 For a comprehensive discussion of the Superfund Amendments, see id. at 2.  These 
authors explain that the Amendment 
reshaped and reauthorized the tax that funded Superfund.  It 
addressed some of the fairness arguments around the edges, by, for 
example, creating an explicit right to contribution among [Potentially 
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Among the enduring criticisms of CERCLA is its silence about who 
qualifies as a “successor corporation[]” for purposes of liability.43  
Consequently, a scholarly and judicial debate has ensued over whether 
state law should determine the definition, or whether the judiciary 
should fashion a uniform federal common law to resolve the debate.44 
Much of the problem stems from the idea that various doctrines exist 
through which a successor corporation can acquire a potentially 
responsible party’s hazardous site.45  Foremost among these doctrines 
are statutory merger, stock acquisition, and the asset purchase 
transactions.46  In some cases, even when liability is not allocated 
through one of these doctrines, courts may choose to pierce the corporate 
veil and impose liability on a parent corporation, an asset purchaser, or 
an otherwise non-liable party. 47 
                                                                                                             
Responsible Parties] and creating an exemption from liability for so 
called “innocent landowners” who purchase contaminated property 
unaware of the contamination, and who meet their requirements. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 27, at 133 (discussing that 
“‘Superfund’ is a trust fund that exists to finance government-directed clean-up efforts, to 
pay claims arising from clean-up activities of private parties who are not liable as 
[Potentially Responsible Parties] under CERCLA . . . .  The Superfund receives its money 
from excise taxes on companies such as the petroleum and chemical industries.”). 
43 Clarke, supra note 32, at 1305-06.  The author explains that although CERCLA is silent 
about who qualifies as a successor corporation, state and common law rules generally are 
adequate to resolve the issue; however, other rules are unable to resolve the issue.  Id. 
44 See infra Parts II.D–E (discussing the arguments for which law should apply in 
determining successor liability). 
45 Clarke, supra note 32, at 1306.  Adding to the problem is the fact that at the time a 
hazardous waste site is discovered, the potentially responsible party may no longer be 
incorporated because of intervening corporate mergers or acquisitions; see Anspec Co., Inc. 
v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 922 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith Land & Improvement 
Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988). 
46 See Clarke, supra note 32, at 1306.  A statutory merger generally requires that the 
successor corporation, after the merger, be responsible for all of the disappearing 
corporations’ liabilities under CERCLA; a merger is governed by a state’s merger laws.  15 
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122, at 185 (rev. perm. 
ed. 1983).  A stock acquisition creates a parent-subsidiary relationship, in which liabilities 
are in most instances separate between entities, including liability under CERCLA.  8 Z. 
CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 161.02 (1990).  Finally, in an asset purchase 
transaction, one company acquires all or most of a seller’s assets, and in most cases, liability 
is not passed with the assets unless there is evidence that the transaction was fraudulent or 
that the transaction is merely a reorganization of the seller’s business.  FLETCHER, supra, at 
§§ 7122–7123.5. 
47 See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:  EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 430 (4th ed. 
Aspen Publishers) (2007).  Steven Ferrey explains the factors considered when determining 
whether an asset purchaser assumes a seller corporation’s liability: 
(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the seller’s 
obligations, (2) the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape 
liability, (3) the transaction is effectively the same as a consolidation or 
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Whereas CERCLA is silent on the issue of successor liability, federal 
circuits are split on whether to draft a federal common law defining 
successor liability, or whether to decide the issue giving deference to a 
forum state’s law.48  The Supreme Court has developed factors that 
should be considered when deciding whether to create federal common 
law or whether to simply rely on a particular state’s law.49 
2. When Is It Appropriate to Draft Federal Common Law? 
First, the question is whether federal courts have the power to draft 
and create federal law, and the answer is “yes!”50  “The authority [to do 
so] had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States 
                                                                                                             
merger of the corporations (the de facto merger exception), or (4) the 
purchasing entity is merely a continuation of the selling corporation. 
Id.  For an example of courts piercing the corporate veil, see Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 
431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981). 
48 See Clarke, supra note 32, at 1306 (discussing the choice that federal courts have 
between applying laws of forum states or developing a federal common law of successor 
liability). 
49 United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715 (1979). 
50 See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). Discussing 
whether federal courts have the authority to draft federal common law following Erie, the 
Supreme Court explained,  
There is, of course, “no general federal common law.”  Nevertheless, 
the Court has recognized the need and authority in some limited areas 
to formulate what has come to be known as “federal common law.”  
These instances are “few and restricted,” and fall into essentially two 
categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is “necessary to 
protect uniquely federal interests,” and those in which Congress has 
given the courts the power to develop substantive law. 
Id. (citations omitted); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943).  
This case involved an action filed by the United States against the Clearfield Trust 
Company to recover the amount of a forged check issued pursuant to service performed 
under the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1935.  Id. at 366.  The Court held that because 
the authority to issue the check was rooted in the Constitution and statutes of the United 
States, and because there was no applicable Act of Congress, the federal courts had the 
duty to create a governing rule of law.  Id. at 367; see also Richard G. Dennis, Liability of 
Officers, Directors and Stockholders Under CERCLA:  The Case for Adopting State Law, 36 VILL. 
L. REV. 1367, 1440 (1991).  Richard G. Dennis noted that Clearfield explained the Court’s 
position as follows: 
[The Court] had occasionally applied state law to federal questions, 
but declared that this case was much different because of the 
significant, adverse effects that state law would have both on the rights 
and duties of the United States and on the large volume of transactions 
involving . . . the United States. 
Dennis, supra at 1440–41.  Although the Clearfield Court deemed it appropriate to fashion 
federal common law, the Court also made it clear that certain circumstances may make 
state law more appropriate than judicially created federal law.  Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. 
at 367. 
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and was in no way dependent on the laws [of any state].”51  However, 
the authority to create a new rule, or federal common law, is very 
different than the Court’s recognized rule under Marbury v. Madison52 
that the judiciary has the responsibility to construe a statute and 
interpret the law.53  Consequently, the Supreme Court is careful not to 
fashion federal common law when it is unnecessary.54 
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., nearly four decades after the 
Court decided that under some circumstances judicial creation of federal 
law might be necessary, the Court crafted three factors to guide courts in 
deciding whether to fashion a federal common law.55  The Kimbell factors 
                                                 
51 See Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. at 726 (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 
318 U.S. 366–67 (1943)).  Compare id., which explained the following: 
This Court has consistently held that federal law governs questions 
involving the rights of the United States arising under nationwide 
federal programs.  “When the United States disburses its funds or pays 
its debts, it is exercising a constitutional function or power. . . . In 
absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to 
fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.” 
Id. (citation omitted) and Clarke, supra note 32, at 1309 (explaining that cases which arise 
under federal laws grant federal courts the power to create federal common laws), with 
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 n.21, also explaining as follows: 
Whether state law is to be incorporated as a matter of federal common 
law . . . involves the . . . problem of the relationship of a particular 
issue to a going federal program.  The question of judicial 
incorporation can only arise in an area which is sufficiently close to a 
national operation to establish competence in the federal courts to 
choose the governing law, and yet not so close as clearly to require the 
application of a single nationwide rule of substance. 
Id. 
52 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty 
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
53 But see N.W. Airlines, Inc. v. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981) (“But the authority 
to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or 
to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt.”). 
54 See O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 90 (1994) (“Federal 
courts, however, ‘unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have 
not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers.’ . . . Unless Congress has otherwise 
directed, the federal court’s task is merely to interpret and apply the relevant rules of state 
law.”) (citation omitted); see also Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 218 
(1997) (“The Court has said that ‘cases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule 
would be justified . . . are . . .  ‘few and restricted.’”). 
55 Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. at 728.  (“Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a 
nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial policy ‘dependent upon a variety of 
considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental interests and to 
the effects upon them of applying state law.’”).  The issue in Kimbell was whether 
contractual liens, created under federal loan programs, took precedence over private liens 
when no applicable Act of Congress existed.  Id. at 715.  To resolve the issue, the Court 
determined whether federal law or state law should decide the issue and established 
several factors that it considered in making its decision.  Id. at 728–29. 
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are as follows:  1) whether there is a need for uniformity;56 2) whether the 
application of state law would disrupt the specific purposes of the 
federal law or program;57 and 3) whether the adoption of a federal rule 
would frustrate commercial relationships rooted in state law.58  More 
specifically, to define further Kimbell’s third factor, some courts consider 
the following three ways that a federal rule could frustrate commercial 
relationships in non-CERCLA liability cases:59  1) whether commercial 
                                                 
56 Id. at 728 (explaining that “when there is little need for a uniform body of law, state 
law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision”).  Many cases applying the Kimbell 
test have considered a variety of factors in determining the appropriate response to 
Kimbell’s first factor of whether there is a need for a uniform federal law; one commentator 
argues that these factors create a more sophisticated analysis of the issue than the standard 
CERCLA cases.  See Dennis, supra note 50, at 1446.  The author argues that 
[f]or the purposes of this discussion, these factors can be grouped into 
four categories:  (1) the presence or absence of express or implied 
congressional intent that a uniform federal rule be created; (2) the 
effects that diverse state laws would have on federal rights; (3) the 
effects that state laws would have on operations; and (4) the likelihood 
that a uniform law could actually be created by the federal courts. 
Id. at 1445–46. 
57 Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. at 728 (arguing that when state law would frustrate a 
federal program’s objective, “we must fashion special rules solicitous of those federal 
interests[]”).  The Court applied these newly created factors and decided to adopt state law 
rather than creating a uniform federal law because the state codes were consistent with 
federal interests and because a uniform federal rule would only disrupt private creditors’ 
daily transactions.  Id. at 729–40. 
58 Id. at 728–29; see also Dennis, supra note 50, at 1442.  The author analyzes the use and 
applicability of the test created in Kimbell Foods: 
The test created in Kimbell Foods has been used in a vast number of 
cases in numerous areas of law.  At the most fundamental level, the 
test is actually about control:  should the federal courts surrender a 
portion of their power to influence the growth and development of a 
federal statute or program, in order to accommodate the interests 
represented in existing law?  The first two elements of the Kimbell Foods 
test measure the extent of the federal interests that are at stake.  The 
final element gauges the possible disruption to the state interests.  In 
essence, the question is whether the federal judiciary will allow the 
development of state law to dictate the direction that the federal 
statute or program will take, at least with respect to the issue in 
question. 
Dennis, supra note 50, at 1442 (footnote omitted).  The author comments that 
courts have held that frustration of commercial relationships established on state 
law may occur in the following three different ways:  first, courts have 
considered the disruption of commercial relationships in actions taken before the 
adoption of a federal rule, where corporations had anticipated that the issue 
would be handled by state law; second, courts have considered the disruption of 
commercial relationships that might occur after a federal rule has become well-
known and widely applied; and third, courts have considered the uncertainty 
caused by the adoption and application of a new federal law.  Id. at 1503–06. 
59 Id. at 1502–03.  The author observes as follows: 
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relationships are disrupted when a corporation anticipated that an issue 
was to be governed by state law;60 2) whether disruption of commercial 
relationships will result once a federal standard has been widely 
applied;61 and 3) whether commercial relationships would be disrupted 
by the uncertainty that newly fashioned federal common law creates.62 
Although the Supreme Court has never decided whether federal 
common law should be fashioned to resolve the issue of successor 
liability, in 1998 the Court briefly noted the disagreement.63  The Court 
did not entertain the issue further because neither party challenged the 
lower court’s ruling on successor liability.64  By not addressing the 
problem, the Court missed the opportunity to resolve the judicial and 
scholarly debate concerning whether federal or state law should apply. 
                                                                                                             
[A]pplication of the law of the state of incorporation to external affairs 
could pose problems if the litigation involved several different 
corporations in an integrated corporate structure, each having a 
different state of incorporation. . . . [Therefore], officers, directors and 
stockholders of a corporation can have no reasonable or legitimate 
expectations that the law of the state of incorporation will protect them 
in CERCLA liability cases.   
In non-CERCLA liability cases, courts have held that disruption 
of commercial relationships predicated on state law may occur in 
several different ways. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
60 Id. at 1503.  See also United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 241–42 (1960).  In Brosnan, 
the Supreme Court did not create a federal common law rule to deal with the nullification 
of federal tax liens in the foreclosure proceedings of particular states.  Id.  The Court held 
that although a federal rule might be helpful for uniformity reasons, it would be more 
consistent with Congress’s prior actions to allow state law to govern.  Id. 
61 Dennis, supra note 50, at 1503; see also United States v. Hadden Haciendas Co., 541 
F.2d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 1976).  In Hadden Haciendas Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
created a federal rule that allowed post-foreclosure actions for damages.  541 F.2d at 785.  
The court created the rule upon finding that the rule did not intrude on states’ laws 
protecting debtors because the protection offered by a state’s statutes could be achieved by 
the application of a federally uniform rule.  Id. 
62 Dennis, supra note 50, at 1503; see also Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 
1454, 1460 (9th Cir. 1986).  In Mardan Corp, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals mentioned 
two concerns that a federal rule might present to litigants applying a newly created federal 
law.  804 F.2d at 1460.  One of these concerns is particularly relevant to the issue of 
successor liability:  whether application of a new federal law, in place of an established 
state law, might create uncertainty as to the manner in which a rule is to be applied in 
different circumstances.  Id. 
63 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n.9 (1998).  (“There is significant 
disagreement among courts and commentators regarding whether, in enforcing CERCLA’s 
indirect liability, courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal common law of 
veil piercing.”).  The Court then cited a slew of court cases and scholarly articles that 
discuss the problem.  Id. 
64 Id. (“Since none of the parties challenges the Sixth Circuit’s holding that CPC and 
Aerojet incurred no derivative liability, the question is not presented in this case, and we 
do not address it further.”). 
Chandler: Survival of the Fittest: Federal Law v. State Law in the Context
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
162 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
C. Determining Who Is a Successor Corporation 
One difficulty courts often face in deciding liability is determining 
who actually is a successor corporation.  In United States v. Davis, the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals considered the question of whether state 
or federal law should apply.65  In deciding the issue, the court considered 
two tests to determine whether a corporation was truly a successor 
corporation under CERCLA:  the “mere continuation” test and the 
“substantial continuation” test.66  Several circuits have applied one of 
these two tests to determine whether a potentially responsible party 
truly is a successor corporation.67 
                                                 
65 United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 53 (1st Cir. 2001).  A disposer of solid waste, found 
liable for clean-up costs under CERCLA, sought contribution from several other potentially 
responsible parties.  Id. at 14–15.  Five of the potentially responsible parties appealed a 
declaratory judgment against them made by the district court.  Id. at 14.  The court, with 
respect to successor liability, addressed the possible use of both the “mere continuation” 
and “substantial continuation” tests.  Id. at 53.  After mentioning these two tests, the court 
looked to the Kimbell factors used for deciding when it is appropriate to fashion a federal 
common law.  Id.  Specifically, the court referenced the “substantial continuation” test as 
one that many courts have referenced when arguing for the need to create a uniform 
federal law; the court also noted that several courts have held that the test satisfies 
CERCLA’s remedial purposes.  Id. 
66 Id. at 52–55.  After considering arguments for and against the application of these 
tests, the Court chose to follow state law, holding that the applicable state law was not 
hostile to federal interests under CERCLA. 
67 Id. at 53.  In this case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the Second and 
Fourth Circuits have considered the “substantial continuation” and “mere continuation” 
tests.  Id.  In B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, the Federal and Connecticut State governments, along 
with a coalition of settling defendants in a previous action, sued non-settling defendants to 
recover costs spent in cleaning up landfills containing hazardous waste.  99 F.3d 505, 511–
13 (2d Cir. 1996).  The Second Circuit, after declining to apply the “mere continuation” test, 
instead applied the common law “substantial continuity” test, reasoning that it is more 
consistent with CERCLA’s goals.  Id. at 519.  In 1997, the Second Circuit clarified its 1996 
holding and further supported adoption of a uniform federal rule under the Kimbell 
analysis, concluding the following in a per curiam opinion: 
[e]ach of the Kimbell Foods factors supports our decision-there is a 
significant need for a uniform rule, allowing lenient state law rules to 
control would defeat federal policy, and we perceive no danger that 
our decision to adopt a federal rule of “substantial continuity” will 
unduly upset existing corporate relationships. 
B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 112 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 1997).  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court 
later denied certiorari on this case.  In United States v. Carolina Transformer, Co., after 
recognizing CERCLA’s silence as to the liability of successor corporations, the Fourth 
Circuit held that successor liability is permitted under CERCLA if it is justified by the facts 
of the case.  978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992).  The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s 
use of the federal common law “substantial continuity” test, stating “[i]n adopting a rule of 
successor liability in this case we ‘must consider traditional and evolving principles of 
federal common law, which Congress has left to the courts to supply interstitially.’”  Id. at 
837–38 (citation omitted).  After applying this test to the facts before them, the court found 
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The “mere continuation” test is designed to help protect creditors 
from corporations that try to avoid hazardous waste claims.68  Courts 
that apply this test generally consider five factors:  1) transfer of assets; 2) 
a purchase by the buyer for less than the fair market value for the assets; 
3) a continuation of the seller’s business by the purchaser; 4) a common 
officer between the two corporations (buyer and seller) that was 
influential in the asset transfer; and 5) an inability of the selling 
corporation to pay its debts after the assets are transferred.69 
The “substantial continuation” test, adopted as the federal common 
law by circuits in favor of uniformity, has been adopted to help resolve 
issues involving potential “successor corporations[.]”70  This test 
incorporates eight factors: 
(1) retention of the same employees [by the buyer]; (2) 
retention of the same supervisory personnel; (3) 
retention of the same production facilities in the same 
location; (4) production of the same product; (5) 
retention of the same name; (6) continuity of assets; (7) 
continuity of general business operations; and (8) 
whether the buyer holds itself out as a continuation of 
the divesting corporation[.]71 
After considering the opposing arguments for application of state 
law versus a federal rule—such as the “substantial continuation” test—
                                                                                                             
FayTranCo. to be a liable successor corporation to Carolina Transformer under CERCLA.  
Id. at 838.  The court reasoned as follows: 
We are unwilling to hold that merely by splitting-off the particular 
part of its operations that resulted in its environmental problems and 
shifting the remainder of its assets, employees, management, 
customers, accounts and production methods to another corporation, 
an otherwise responsible corporation could all but completely wash its 
hands of its environmental liability. 
Id. at 840. 
68 Davis, 261 F.3d at 53 (citation omitted) (“The ‘mere continuation’ test is an exception to 
the common law rule that the buyer of a corporation’s assets (as opposed to its stock) does 
not incur liability for the divesting corporation’s debts.  The test is designed to protect 
creditors from sales that seek to evade valid claims.”). 
69 Id. 
70 Id.; Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d at 838; see also Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that most states do 
not recognize the “substantial continuation” test). 
71 Davis, 261 F.3d at 53 (citation omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted) (explaining 
that courts adopt the “substantial continuation” test because it meets CERCLA’s “broad 
remedial purpose” and emphasizes the “importance of national uniformity” in 
determining successor liability). 
Chandler: Survival of the Fittest: Federal Law v. State Law in the Context
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
164 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
the Davis Court chose to apply Connecticut’s “mere continuation” test.72  
In deciding which law to apply, the court applied the Kimbell factors, and 
concluded, “to justify the creation of a federal rule, ‘there must be a 
specific concrete federal policy or interest that is compromised by the 
application of state law.’”73 
D. Circuits Adopting Federal Common Law 
CERCLA enforcement should not be hampered by subordination of its goals 
to varying state law rules of alter ego theory and limited liability.  Because of the 
lack of persuasive authority arguing for a contrary result, the choice of federal 
common law to govern this area appears likely to become a matter of settled 
law.74 
 
Ascertaining the scope of legislative intent in enacting CERCLA 
helps to understand the issues Congress desired to resolve with 
CERCLA.75  In 1980, then Representative James Florio, the primary 
sponsor for CERCLA, argued before the House of Representatives that 
one of CERCLA’s primary purposes was “[t]o insure [sic] the 
development of a uniform rule of law, and to discourage business [sic] 
dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in States with 
                                                 
72 Id. at 54.  (“We have concluded that the majority rule is to apply state law ‘so long as it 
is not hostile to the federal interests animating CERCLA[.]’”). 
73 Id. 
74 See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 455. 
75 See supra note 20 (explaining various representatives’ opinions concerning CERCLA’s 
legislation); see also Dennis, supra note 50, 1473–74.  Richard G. Dennis sought to establish 
the objectives of CERCLA through legislative history by paraphrasing Senator Randolph’s, 
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, description of 
CERCLA’s purpose.  Dennis, supra note 50, at 1473.  Dennis stated that the Senate bill was 
aimed at the following objectives: 
First, to make those who release hazardous substances strictly 
liable for cleanup costs, mitigation, and third party damages. . . .  
Second, the bill would establish a broad Federal response 
authority, and a fund of $4.1 billion over 6 years to clean up and 
mitigate damages where a liable party does not clean up or cannot be 
found. 
Third, the bill would provide an opportunity through the courts, 
and a more limited opportunity through the fund, for victims to 
receive prompt and adequate compensation for losses and injuries. 
Fourth, the bill would provide that the fund be financed largely 
by those industries and consumers who profit from products and 
services associated with the hazardous substances which impose risks 
on society. 
Id. at 1474. 
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more lenient laws[.]”76  Although this statement may provide courts an 
immediate reason for adopting a federal rule that fills gaps in a federal 
statute, the Supreme Court has cautioned that controversies affecting the 
administration of federal programs do not require resolution by uniform 
federal rules.77  In contrast, the Court has stated that “[w]hether to adopt 
state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial 
policy ‘dependent upon a variety of considerations always relevant to 
the nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon 
them of applying state law.’”78  In the controversy regarding which law 
to apply when determining successor liability under CERCLA, two 
circuits, the Third and the Fourth, have decided that creating a uniform 
federal rule would best serve CERCLA’s purposes.79 
                                                 
76 126 CONG. REC. H31,965 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio).  For a short 
biographical account of Representative Florio, see BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONGRESS 1774–2005 1064 (Andrew R. Dodge & Betty K. Koed eds., U.S. Gov. 
Printing Office 2005): 
Florio, James Joseph, a Representative from New Jersey; born in 
Brooklyn, N.Y., August 29, 1937; attended the public elementary 
schools in Brooklyn; received high school equivalency diploma from 
State of New Jersey; B.A., Trenton (N.J.) State College, 1962; graduate 
work, Columbia University, New York, 1962–1963; J.D., Rutgers 
University Law School, 1967; admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1967 
and commenced practice in Camden; served in United States Navy, 
1955–1958, ensign; lieutenant commander, United States Navy 
Reserve, 1958–1975; assistant city attorney for Camden City Legal 
Department, 1967–1971; solicitor for the New Jersey towns of 
Runnemade, Wood-Lynne, and Somerdale, 1969–1974; assemblyman, 
New Jersey State Legislature, 1970–1974; unsuccessful candidate for 
the nomination for Governor of New Jersey in 1977 and unsuccessful 
candidate for Governor in 1981; elected as a Democrat to the Ninety-
fourth and to the seven succeeding Congresses and served from 
January 3, 1975, until his resignation January 16, 1990; elected 
Governor of New Jersey in 1989 and served from January 16, 1990, to 
January 18, 1994; unsuccessful candidate for reelection in 1993; is a 
resident of Gloucester Township, N.J. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
77 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727–28 (1979). 
78 Id. at 728. 
79 New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 208 (2d Cir. 2006).  The court, in 
analyzing the choice of law question, compared the holdings and decisions of its sister 
circuits.  Id. at 207–08.  Specifically, the court noted that the Third and Fourth Circuits had 
concluded that a national rule is required by CERCLA.  Id. at 208; see United States v. 
Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992).  Carolina Transformer Co. was the 
result of the removal of polychlorinated biphenyls from a site previously owned by 
Defendant Carolina Transformer, Inc.  978 F.2d at 834.  While the Defendants owned the 
site, they recovered and repaired electrical transformers on the site and carcinogenic-
bearing transformer oil spilled onto the site.  Id.  Consequently, Carolina Transformer was 
sued along with FayTranCo and several other corporations in an action to recover the costs 
incurred in cleaning up the site.  Id.  After noting that CERCLA is silent as to the issue of 
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The Third Circuit was the first to favor creating a uniform federal 
rule to resolve CERCLA’s silence regarding successor liability.80  The 
                                                                                                             
successor liability, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held it appropriate to “consider 
traditional and evolving principles of federal common law, which Congress has left to the 
courts to supply interstitially.”  Id. at 837–38.  After adopting a federal common law 
approach, the court applied the “substantial continuity” approach in finding FayTranCo 
liable as a successor corporation to Carolina Transformer.  Id. at 838.  The Fourth Circuit 
found the following facts most relevant in finding substantial continuity between 
FayTranCo and Carolina Transformer, and consequently holding FayTranCo liable as a 
successor: 
In sum, we find that there was substantial continuity between Carolina 
Transformer and FayTranCo.  FayTranCo retained most of Carolina 
Transformer’s employees working in the same jobs, receiving the same 
salary, and maintaining accrued leave time.  Many, if not all, of 
Carolina Transformer’s supervisory personnel went to similar 
positions at FayTranCo.  Dewey Strother continued to have personal 
influence over and involvement with the new company. Carolina 
Transformer’s equipment, inventory and motor vehicles were 
transferred to FayTranCo. Moreover, the move to new premises was 
an integral part of an apparent attempt by those controlling FayTranCo 
and Carolina Transformer to distance themselves, both physically and 
legally, from the PCB-contaminated Middle Road site. FayTranCo 
produced basically the same product as Carolina Transformer, and any 
changes in the product were dictated by external market forces, which 
would have operated with equal force on Carolina Transformer had 
there not been a transfer of the business to FayTranCo. There was a 
continuity of assets, Carolina Transformer having transferred all of its 
assets with the exception of the buildings and land at the Middle Road 
site. FayTranCo held itself out as being a continuation of Carolina 
Transformer, informing its credit customers that their debts would 
become the accounts of FayTranCo. Finally, the record as a whole 
leaves the unmistakable impression that the transfer of the Carolina 
Transformer business to FayTranCo was part of an effort to continue 
the business in all material respects yet avoid the environmental 
liability arising from the PCB contamination at the Middle Road site. 
For these reasons, we are of opinion that the district court did not err 
in granting summary judgment against FayTranCo as a successor 
corporation. 
Id. at 840–41. 
80 Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988).  This 
case involved the purchase of land containing hazardous waste.  Id. at 87.  The purchaser 
sued potentially responsible parties seeking contribution for expenses incurred in cleaning 
up the site’s hazardous waste.  Id.  The defendant argued that the contract principle of 
caveat emptor acted as a defense to liability; the court rejected this defense, reasoning that 
to apply caveat emptor as a defense would completely frustrate Congress’s objective for 
enacting CERCLA.  Id. at 88–90.  The court interpreted that CERCLA intended the expenses 
to be the responsibility of one of two sources:  1) those persons who had an integral part in 
the creation or continuation of the hazardous waste, or 2) taxpayers.  Id. at 92.  Finally, the 
court held that the issue should be governed by a federal rule of successor liability.  Id.  
Specifically, the court held that the general doctrine of successor liability as applied in the 
majority of states should be applied in the case, reasoning, “[i]n resolving the successor 
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Circuit’s first consideration of the issue came in its 1988 decision in Smith 
Land & Improvement v. Celotex Corp.; however, the Third Circuit revisited 
the issue in 2005 in United States v. General Battery Corp., Inc.81  In General 
Battery, Exide—the undisputed successor corporation to General 
Battery—was sued by the United States to recover costs incurred for 
clean-up initiated by the government after the EPA had decided that 
remedial action on several properties was required to protect human 
health.82  The hazardous waste found at the properties was disposed of 
between 1920 and 1966 by Price Battery (a now-defunct company), a 
manufacturer of acid batteries.83  In 1966, General Battery purchased 
Price Battery.84  In 2000, General Battery then merged with Exide 
Corporation, resulting in Exide being named a successor in interest to 
General Battery for purposes of liability under CERCLA.85  Exide 
contended that although it was a successor corporation to General 
                                                                                                             
liability issues here, the district court must consider national uniformity; otherwise, 
CERCLA aims may be evaded easily by a responsible party’s choice to arrange a merger or 
consolidation under the laws of particular states which unduly restrict successor liability.”  
Id. 
81 United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that 
the court had addressed the same issue in Smith Land, where it held that a uniform federal 
law should be adopted as derived from the general doctrine of successor liability adopted 
by the majority of states). 
82 Id. at 296.  A 1992 EPA study found that several properties contained excessive levels 
of lead.  Id.  Consequently, the United States government incurred several million dollars in 
response-costs to clean up and install a remedial “cap” at the properties.  Id. 
83 Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d at 296; see also Richard A. Smolen, Note, Get the Lead 
Out:  Innocent Successor Corporations Responsibility Under CERCLA—United States v. General 
Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005)., 25 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 137, 144 
(2006).  Richard Smolen explained in greater detail that Price Battery was a Pennsylvania 
corporation that disposed “of old battery casings while reusing the lead plates from old 
batteries.”  Smolen, supra, at 144. 
84 Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d at 296.  General Battery acquired Price Battery for cash 
and stock.  Id.  More specifically, General Battery acquired all of the company’s assets—
except for Price Battery’s real property—for $2.95 million, 100,000 shares of General Battery 
stock, and a seat on General Battery’s board of directors.  Id.  However, Price Battery sold 
their real property to a development organization, which leased the property to General 
Battery until 1978 when the deed was transferred to General Battery for $1.  Id. at 297.  
Additionally, under the purchase agreement, General Battery acquired Price Battery’s 
equipment, as well as all intellectual property and inventory.  Id.  General Battery also 
assumed responsibility of Price’s contractual obligations and all of their liabilities 
appearing on Price’s balance sheet.  Id.  Finally, General Battery continued to employee 
Price’s three executive officers and continued to manufacture batteries at Price Battery’s 
Hamburg plant.  Id. 
85 Id. at 296 (“Exide is General Battery’s successor.  The disputed issue is whether 
General Battery, by virtue of its 1966 acquisition of Price Battery, was a successor to Price 
Battery.”). 
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Battery, General Battery was not a successor corporation to Price Battery; 
and, therefore, Exide was not liable as a successor in interest.86 
After considering the facts, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
reasoned that CERCLA requires a uniform federal definition of 
“successor corporation[.]”87  The court focused on the idea that state law 
varies widely on the issue of successor liability and that this uncertainty 
favors federal uniformity.88  Additionally, the court reasoned that the 
                                                 
86 Id. at 297. 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held the 
Price/General transaction constituted a common law “de facto 
merger.” . . . [T]he parties stipulated to past CERCLA response costs at 
the Hamburg site in the amount of $6,500,000.  Exide retained the right 
to file this appeal as to liability. 
Id. at 297.  See also Smolen, supra note 83, at 147.  The United States alleged that Exide was 
liable as a successor in interest and both parties sought summary judgment.  Id.  The 
District Court denied Exide’s motion and granted the government’s motion, holding that 
General Battery and Price Battery had engaged in a “de facto merger.”  Id.  Exide then 
appealed, to the Third Circuit.  Id.  On appeal, the Third Circuit split their consideration of 
the matter into two issues:  whether state or federal law should resolve the issue of 
successor liability, and whether Price Battery and General Battery had truly engaged in a 
“de facto merger[.]”  Id. 
87 Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d at 300.  The court held, “‘[t]he resulting federal rule, 
based on a body of case law developed over time, is statutory interpretation pursuant to 
congressional direction,’ not the free-wheeling creation of federal common law.’”  Id. 
(quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998)). 
88 Id. at 302. (“A more uniform and predictable federal liability standard corresponds 
with specific CERCLA objectives by encouraging settlements and facilitating a more liquid 
market in corporate and ‘brownfield’ assets.”); see also Smolen, supra note 83, at 148.  
Among other points, Smolen emphasized the following: 
The court then addressed Exide's contention that the Supreme Court in 
O’Melveny had eroded the Third Circuit’s precedents because it had 
“cautioned against the unwarranted displacement of state law.”  The 
Third Circuit reasoned that this reasoning was inapposite because 
CERCLA creates its own federal cause of action.  Furthermore, the 
court noted that recent Supreme Court decisions had indicated that 
gaps in the statutory language should be filled with federal common 
law and that a state-by-state determination of liability conflicts with 
the objectives of CERCLA.  Moreover, the court noted with 
particularity the minutiae of different standards used in different 
jurisdictions, and advocated that that lack of uniformity was reason 
enough for using a set federal standard. 
Smolen, supra note 83, at 148 (footnotes omitted).  “Brownfield site” has been defined as 
“[a]n abandoned, idled, or underused industrial or commercial site that is difficult to 
expand or redevelop because of environmental contamination.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
206 (8th ed. 2004).  One of CERCLA’s objectives is to encourage settlements among adverse 
litigants and to advance and facilitate a liquid market in “brownfield” assets, or, in other 
words, to encourage the clean-up, transfer, and redevelopment of contaminated sites.  42 
U.S.C. §§ 9607(r), 9622 (2006).  The Third Circuit in General Battery reasoned that a more 
uniform and predictable standard would satisfy CERCLA’s goals of encouraging 
settlements and creating a more liquid market for “brownfield” assets.  Gen. Battery Corp., 
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purpose of the 2001 Amendments to CERCLA—“to balance the interest 
in cost recovery under CERCLA’s liability provisions with the economic 
interest in a liquid market for ‘brownfield’ assets[]”—would be served 
by a uniform test for successor liability.89  The court concluded by 
distinguishing the creation of a federal uniform law from statutory 
interpretation.90  The court held that creating a uniform definition of 
“successor corporation” constitutes interpretation and not statutory 
construction.91  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
October of 2006, leaving the issue undecided.92 
Courts wrestle with whether it is appropriate to create federal 
common law rules.93  In 1966, the Supreme Court explained that, before 
federal common law can be created, a significant conflict must be present 
between federal interests and the application of state law.94  
Additionally, the Court has held that the creation of federal law is 
restricted to issues in which Congress has specifically granted courts the 
power to create common law and to issues where federal common law is 
necessary to guard particular federal interests.95  Consequently, many 
courts and scholars have been in favor of the application of state law.96 
                                                                                                             
Inc., 423 F.3d at 302.  But see Smolen, supra note 83, at 151–52 (explaining that applying a 
uniform rule under CERCLA would not satisfy Congress’s purposes, and would be 
contrary to Congress’s desire to have state common law rules resolve the issue). 
89 Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d at 303 n.8.  The court also noted two cases from the 
First Circuit (a proponent of applying state law to resolve the successor liability issue) and 
one from the Third Circuit which explained that reducing litigation costs was a primary 
objective of CERCLA.  Id.  The court concluded this portion of the opinion by stating, 
“CERCLA’s goal of minimizing litigation and transaction costs is ill-served by a case-by-
case approach to the question of successor liability choice-of-law, we need not inquire 
whether Pennsylvania law conflicts with or mirrors the majority successor liability doctrine 
before holding that a federal rule applies.”  Id. at 304. 
90 Id. (“[T]he authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different than the authority 
to fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to 
adopt.”). 
91 Id. 
92 Exide Techs. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 41 (2006) (The Supreme Court denied the 
petition for writ of certiorari). 
93 Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 451 (“Such confusion is not unusual in areas of 
substantive law where the need for a federal common law rule of veil-piercing is 
recognized.”). 
94 Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (holding that state law 
should apply because no conflict existed between the federal act in question and the 
application of Louisiana state law) (footnote omitted). 
95 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1980).  
[T]he Court has recognized the need and authority in some limited 
areas to formulate what has come to be known as ‘federal common 
law.’  These instances are ‘few and restricted,’ and fall into essentially 
two categories:  those in which a federal rule of decision is ‘necessary 
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E.  Argument for Application of State Law 
State law is incorporated to govern interpretation of contractual 
agreements allocating CERCLA liability; there is no reason to think 
that [a] uniform body of law is required, application of state law would 
not frustrate specific objective[s] of CERCLA, and fashioning national 
interpretive standard[s] might interfere with reasonable commercial 
expectations.97 
 
If the definition of successor liability was to be decided by a majority 
vote among the federal circuits, the argument for application of state law 
would win 4-2.98  Four circuits have favored the application of state 
law—the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh.99  To give a comprehensive, 
but not exhaustive, consideration of the argument for application of state 
law, three of the circuits’ holdings will be considered below.100  The most 
recent circuit to hold in favor of state law is the First Circuit in United 
States v. Davis, and it is considered in Part II.E.1.101  The Sixth and Ninth 
Circuits’ adoptions of state law will be considered in Parts II.E.2 and 
II.E.3, respectively. 
                                                                                                             
to protect uniquely federal interests,’ and those in which Congress has 
given the courts the power to develop substantive law[.] 
Id.  (citations omitted). 
96 See infra Part II.E (presenting the arguments for the application of state law to 
determine whether a party is liable for clean-up under CERCLA). 
97 P. H. Vartanian, Annotation, Duty of Federal Courts, Since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, in 
Determining Ultimate Federal Question, to Follow State Laws or State Court Decisions of 
Substantive Character, Upon Questions Which Are Preliminary, Incidental, or Collateral to the 
Ultimate Federal Question, 140 A.L.R. 717 (1942). 
98 New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 207–08 (2006) (citing the various 
circuits’ current stances on the application of federal law or state law). 
99 Id. 
100 See infra Parts II.E.1–3 (discussing the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits’ reasoning for 
application of state law to resolve the issue of successor liability). 
101 United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 52–55 (1st Cir. 2001).  In this case, defendant Davis 
operated a waste disposal site in Rhode Island in the 1970s.  Id. at 15.  In the early 1980s, the 
EPA placed the site on the National Priorities List, and in 1987, the EPA issued an order 
describing the clean-up necessary at the site.  Id.  The report indicated that the clean-up 
required the government to complete a water line that would supply clean drinking water 
to areas where the water wells had been contaminated and where other wells were 
threatened by possible contamination.  Id.  The report also required that the government 
clean up any contaminated groundwater and excavate and clean soils that had been 
contaminated and that were a source of contaminating the groundwater.  Id.  When the 
United States government filed suit in 1990, 100 homes were within one mile of the site, 
and approximately 3,800 residents lived within three miles of the site.  Id. 
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1. The First Circuit 
In Davis, the government brought suit against Davis as an owner-
operator to collect costs incurred for the clean-up of a hazardous site.102  
On appeal, several possible responsible parties argued that they were not 
successors in interest to the Davis site, and were therefore not liable.103  
Black & Decker argued that the federal common law “substantial 
continuation” test should govern the issue of successor corporation 
under CERCLA, whereas Electroformers argued that the State of 
Connecticut’s “mere continuation” test should govern.104  In evaluating 
which test to apply, the Davis Court considered the Kimbell factors to be 
used when deciding whether to create federal rules.105 
The Davis court noted that some circuits have chosen to adopt the 
“substantial continuation” test because it satisfies CERCLA’s “broad 
remedial purpose” and because of the “importance of national 
uniformity.”106  However, the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this 
rationale and instead decided that the majority rule is to follow state law 
as long as it does not frustrate federal interests under CERCLA.107  
Furthermore, the Davis Court rebutted the argument for creating a 
federal rule by explaining that no specific or concrete federal policy 
would be compromised by applying state law.108 
                                                 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 52. 
104 Id. at 52–53. 
105 Id. at 53. 
In general, before creating a federal rule courts must consider whether 
federal interests require a nationally uniform body of law, whether 
applying state law would frustrate or conflict with a specific federal 
objective, and the extent to which a federal rule would disrupt 
commercial relationships predicated on state law. 
Id.; see infra Parts III.A–C (discussing the application of these factors to the issue of whether 
state or federal law should govern in the realm of successor liability). 
106 Davis, 261 F.3d at 53.  The court reconsidered the lower court’s application of the 
“mere continuation” test and found Black & Decker to be a successor corporation, and 
therefore liable for clean-up costs.  Id. at 54.  In deciding this, the court looked to the 
following facts:  “(1) MITE and Electroformers did not share a common officer or director 
who was involved in the transfer; (2) MITE received fair compensation for Gar; (3) MITE 
continued to operate its other businesses; [and] (4) MITE remained financially viable.”  Id.. 
107 Id. at 52. 
108 Id. at 54 (explaining that no evidence existed suggesting that the application of state 
law to the facts of Davis’s case would frustrate federal goals). 
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2. The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit was one of the first to address the issue of 
successor liability in Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc.109  In this 
case, Plaintiff Anspec bought land in Michigan in 1978 from Defendant 
Ultaspherics.110  After selling the property, Ultraspherics went through a 
series of mergers ending in 1987 when it merged with Hoover Group, the 
designated surviving corporation.111  Sometime prior to selling the 
property to Anspec, Ultraspherics buried an underground storage tank 
on the property and placed two above-ground storage tanks on the 
site.112  All of the tanks were filled to capacity with hazardous 
substances, which later leaked into the soil and groundwater.113  
Additionally, Utlaspherics further contaminated the site through various 
leaks and spills of toxic liquids.114  After being charged by the 
government to clean up the site, Anspec contacted Ultraspherics 
requesting them to pay the costs for the clean-up; Ultraspherics, 
however, refused.115 
After reviewing both CERCLA’s language and legislative history, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that neither CERCLA’s 
language nor legislative history supported the inference that Congress 
                                                 
109 Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991). 
110 Id. at 1243. 
111 Id.  The court cited Fletcher, explaining that when two corporations statutorily merge, 
all liabilities are the responsibility of the surviving corporation.  Id. 
In case of merger of one corporation into another, where one of the 
corporations ceases to exist and the other corporation continues in 
existence, the latter corporation is liable for the debts, contracts and 
torts of the former, at least to the extent of the property and assets 
received, and this liability is often expressly imposed by statute. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 226.  The Anspec court argued 
later in the opinion that 
the law in the fifty states on corporate dissolution and successor 
liability is largely uniform.  For example, all states agree that the 
surviving corporation in a statutory merger assumes the debts and 
liabilities of the constituent corporations.  And all states have statutes 
providing for post-dissolution liability of corporations for liabilities 
existing prior to dissolution. 
Anspec Co., Inc., 922 F.2d at 1249 (citations omitted). 
112 Id. at 1243. 
113 Id.  The facts indicated that contamination was the result of Ultrapsheric’s routine 
disposal of hazardous sludge and liquids that caused the hazardous materials to spill into 
the soil and groundwater.  Id.  In addition, toxic cleaning solvents leaked, thereby further 
contaminating the soil and groundwater.  Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. (“The plaintiffs notified Ultraspherics that they were required to clean up the site 
and requested Ultraspherics to pay the costs associated with the cleanup.  When 
Ultraspherics refused this request, the plaintiffs filed the present action.”). 
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intended to create a uniform federal rule of successor liability.116  After 
reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that a “corporation[,]” as 
defined under section 9607 of CERCLA, should be determined based on 
the law upon which the “corporation” was formed.117  The court held 
that because all of the corporations involved in the litigation were 
created under state law, the question of successor liability should also be 
determined by the law of the state under which the litigants were 
incorporated, unless the application of state law would interfere with 
federal policy.118  Additionally, the court reasoned that application of the 
Kimbell test supported adoption of state corporation law when resolving 
the issue of successor liability.119  Finally, the court disagreed with the 
common argument among its sister circuits that have promoted the 
creation of federal law, noting that adoption of state law would cause 
states to engage in a “race to the bottom” (passing more lenient laws 
limiting vicarious liability) in an effort to attract corporations.120  The 
Anspec court instead concluded that states have an interest in protecting 
their resources and citizens—an interest that most states have expressed 
                                                 
116 Id. at 1248 n.1 (“CERCLA is silent rather than unambiguous on the issue of the 
meaning of ‘corporation’ generally and successor liability specifically.”).  But see Dennis, 
supra note 50, at 1445 (explaining that other considerations suggest that uniformity may 
have been Congress’s intent; the author quoted Representative Florio stating, “[t]o insure 
[sic] the development of a uniform rule of law, and to discourage business [sic] dealing in 
hazardous substances from locating primarily in states with more lenient laws, the bill will 
encourage the further development of a Federal common law in this area”). 
117 Anspec Co., Inc., 922 F.2d at 1248.  The court reached this conclusion following a 
discussion of which law was appropriate given CERCLA’s purposes and legislative 
history.  Id. at 1247. 
118 Id. at 1248.  The court quoted several authors, noting as follows: 
The federal “command” to incorporate state law may be a judicial 
rather than a legislative command; that is, it may be determined as a 
matter of choice of law, even in the absence of statutory command or 
implication, that, although federal law should “govern” a given 
question, state law furnishes an appropriate and convenient measure 
of the content of this federal law.  
Id. at 148 n.2 (quoting P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN, & D. SHAPIRO, HART & 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 862 (3d ed. 1988)).  The Anspec 
court later concluded its opinion, quoting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and holding 
that these rules provide that whether a corporation is to sue or be sued is determined by 
the law under which the corporation was organized.  Anspec Co., Inc., 922 F.2d at 1251. 
119 Anspec Co., Inc., 922 F.2d at 1249 n.5.  The court also noted that two of its sister circuits 
had not mentioned the Kimbell test in holding that federal common law should govern the 
issue of successor liability, stating, “[b]oth of those courts concluded, almost without 
analysis, that a federal common law of successor liability was required by CERCLA.”  Id.  
The court also considered whether the application of state law is inadequate to accomplish 
the purposes of CERCLA, and the court held that state law is adequate.  Id. 
120 Id. at 1250. 
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by creating statutes and administrative bodies similar to CERCLA and 
the EPA.121 
3. The Ninth Circuit 
Although more circuits have decided in favor of state law rather 
than a federal common law, arguments are fairly consistent among the 
circuits.122  Among the circuits in support of state law is the Ninth 
Circuit, which, in a 1997 opinion, switched from supporting federal 
common law to adopting state law.123  In Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., the plaintiff railroad company leased 
property to the defendant agricultural chemical business.124  The EPA 
ordered the defendant to clean-up contamination found on the 
property.125  After learning that the defendant could not clean up the site, 
the EPA ordered the plaintiff to undertake clean up action.126  Having 
                                                 
121 Id.  (“I see no necessity to create federal common law in this area to guard against the 
risk that states will create safe havens for polluters.”). 
122 Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996).  The 
Eleventh Circuit, following many of the same positions of its sister circuits supporting 
application of state law, stated as follows: 
Absent a showing that state partnership law is inadequate to achieve 
the goals of CERCLA, “we discern no imperative need to develop a 
general body of federal common law to decide cases such as this.” 
. . . .  
. . . CERCLA does not require that federal law displace state laws 
governing the liability of limited partners unless these laws permit 
action prohibited by the Act, or unless “their application would be 
inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action.” . . .  
. . . Consequently federal law governing liability under CERCLA 
should incorporate the applicable state law rule for determining when 
a limited partner loses its limited liability status so as to become 
accountable for the CERCLA liability of the partnership. 
Id. at 1501–02 (citations omitted). 
123 159 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1997).  The court opined: 
PureGro, on the other hand, would have us reexamine existing Ninth 
Circuit precedent in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions and 
hold that there is no need for a federal common law of successor 
liability under CERCLA, and that state law supplies the rule of 
decision in this area.  We have jurisdiction . . . and we affirm the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of PureGro. 
Id. at 360. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 361 (“The Railroads sued PureGro as [Brown & Bryant’s] successor-in-interest, 
seeking private cost recovery, contribution and declaratory relief under CERCLA and 
numerous state claims.”); see also Dopf, supra note 32, at 184 (explaining that the Railroads 
argued that PureGro was liable under two tests:  the fraudulently entered transaction 
exception and the mere substantial continuation exception). 
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realized they could not afford the clean-up, the defendant decided to sell 
his business to co-defendant PureGro.127  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of PureGro, ruling that it was not liable as a 
successor-in-interest for clean-up actions, and the plaintiff appealed.128 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals began its discussion by noting 
that since 1990, when it had supported a federal rule in Louisiana-Pacific 
Corp. v. Asarco, Inc.,129 the Supreme Court has decided that the instances 
for creating federal rules are “few and restricted[.]”130  In Atchison, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then explained that even where a federal 
statute is involved, federal courts should not always fashion a federal 
rule, especially when the application of state law will satisfy the purpose 
of the federal statute.131  Finally, considering that the formation of 
corporations and corporate liability are normally matters of state law, the 
court applied the Kimbell test and concluded that the application of state 
law is appropriate.132  Applying California State law, the court held that 
PureGro was not liable under the “mere continuation” test.133 
                                                 
127 Atchison, 159 F.3d at 360. 
Paying the appraised value for the equipment, PureGro bought half of 
B & B’s equipment pursuant to an Equipment Sale Agreement.  The 
agreement specified that it was not to be construed as a purchase of B 
& B’s business and that PureGro would not be considered de jure or de 
facto a successor to B & B. 
Id.  The agreement also contained indemnity provisions that conditioned the purchase on 
absolving PureGro of any environmental liability.  Id. 
128 Id. at 360. (“In this appeal, the Railroads ask us to exercise our powers under federal 
common law to expand successor corporate liability under CERCLA.”). 
129 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990). 
130 Atchison, 159 F.3d at 362.  (explaining that the Supreme “Court rejected many of the 
very arguments that La.-Pac. accepted in deciding CERCLA necessitated a set of uniform 
federal rules for successor liability”). 
131 Id.  The court noted, “O’Melveny tells us that when dealing with a ‘comprehensive and 
detailed’ federal statutory regulation, a court should instead presume that matters left 
unaddressed in such a scheme are subject to state law.”  Id.; see also Dopf, supra note 32, at 
194. 
132 See Atchison, 159 F.3d at 363.  The court reasoned as follows: 
“[T]o invoke the concept of ‘uniformity’ . . . is not to prove its need.”  
Although often invoked in this context, there has been no real 
explanation of the need for uniformity in the particular area of 
successor liability—especially since state law will in many other 
instances determine whom the EPA may or may not look to for 
compensation.  If state law varied widely on the issue of successor 
liability, perhaps the need for a uniform federal rule would be more 
apparent.  This is not the case, however, as ‘the law in the fifty states 
on corporate dissolution and successor liability is largely uniform.’  
The argued “need” for uniformity thus stems not from disarray among 
the various states, but from the alleged need for a more expansive 
view of successor liability than state law currently provides—in other 
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No matter which law is chosen to govern in this realm, CERCLA’s 
legislative history makes clear that Congress’s primary concern was not 
disruption of state law, but the threats to human health and the 
environment created by hazardous waste.134 
III.  ANALYSIS:  WHETHER TO ADOPT STATE LAW OR FEDERAL LAW TO 
DECIDE THE ISSUE OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
Arguably, CERCLA is an example of legislation enacted hastily to 
combat a serious matter of public concern; it contains gaps and defects, 
as is reflected in the issue of successor liability.135  In 1944, the Supreme 
Court held that, in the context of limited liability, federal statutes are 
preferable to state common law rules.136  As a result, some commentators 
                                                                                                             
words, the notion that state law on this issue is inadequate for 
CERCLA’s purposes. 
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Dopf, supra note 32, at 190. Dopf agreed with 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding that state law appropriately provides the applicable rule for 
successor liability.  Dopf, supra note 32, at 190.  Dopf further argued that although 
legislative history supports the adoption of a uniform rule, Congress has never hinted that 
state corporation law should be displaced.  Id. at 192.  Citing CERCLA’s sponsor’s 
advocacy of adopting a uniform rule, the author contends that the personal conclusions of 
one member of Congress cannot outweigh the absence of support for a uniform rule in 
CERCLA’s text or relevant committee reports.  Id. 192–93. 
133 Atchison, 159 F.3d at 364.  Applauding the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Atchison, one 
author provided the following explanation: 
The application of existing state law is preferable to the creation of new 
federal common law.  State law, which has evolved over many years is 
frequently codified in statutes, is well developed and can be easily 
discoverable and applicable.  In contrast, “the creation of new federal 
common law is a difficult, open-ended, and long term task.”  If courts 
were to begin creating new federal common law, they would bear the 
burden of fashioning rules appropriate to the circumstances that each 
element of corporation law would bring with it. 
Dopf, supra note 32, at 199 (footnotes omitted). 
134 See Clarke, supra note 32, at 1313.  Clarke also noted: 
Even if a uniform federal rule of successor liability had a greater effect 
on the business community than expected, CERCLA’s legislative 
history reveals that Congress was far more concerned with the 
substantial threats to human health and the environment posed by the 
national hazardous waste disposal problem than it was with 
disrupting commercial relationships based on state law. 
Id. 
135 See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons for, and 
consequences of, CERCLA’s hasty enactment, the resultant statutory deficiencies, and the 
judicial system’s efforts to resolve issues created by the Act’s deficiencies). 
136 Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 452 n.142.  The authors quote Anderson v. 
Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 365 (1944): “no State may endow its corporate creatures with the 
power to place themselves above the Congress of the United States and defeat the federal 
policy . . . which Congress has announced.”  Id. 
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propose that federal courts now have the responsibility to fashion 
uniform rules that pierce the corporate veil in order to identify liable 
parties and achieve the specific purposes of the federal statute.137  To the 
contrary, some scholars maintain that CERCLA’s silence on the matter 
supports the application of state law, and thereby respects the 
philosophy of federalism.138  Indeed, many arguments have been raised 
to potentially resolve the issue, and some are more persuasive than 
others.139  Unfortunately, however, neither Congress nor the Supreme 
Court has adopted an argument that might potentially quiet the twenty-
eight-year-young controversy.140 
In Kimbell, the Supreme Court noted that judicial policy, viewed in 
light of three different factors, would guide courts when deciding 
whether to fashion a nationwide federal law.141  These factors include 
whether a need for uniformity exists, whether the application of state 
law would disrupt the specific purposes of the federal law or program, 
and whether the adoption of a federal rule would frustrate commercial 
relationships rooted in state law.142  This test has been used in a vast 
number of cases, dealing with a variety of legal issues.143  Consequently, 
Part III of this Note will analyze the successor liability problem under 
CERCLA using the framework and factors outlined by the Supreme 
Court in Kimbell. 
                                                 
137 Id.  But see Warren, supra note 3, at 326. 
138 Warren, supra note 3, at 326.  The author stated: 
State law could be fashioned to favor corporations by allowing them to 
escape liability as successors under CERCLA, or it could give 
preference to environmental concerns and promulgate successor 
liability standards that are tough on corporations.  Regardless, many 
people argue that CERCLA’s silence on the issue necessitates deference 
to state law. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
139 See supra Parts II.D–E. (discussing the various arguments for the adoption of federal 
law and those for the application of state law to resolve the issue of successor liability). 
140 See infra Parts IV.A–C (explaining ways in which Congress or the Supreme Court 
could resolve the issue of successor liability). 
141 See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text (discussing the Kimbell factors and their 
wide application to different areas of the law, and also explaining how the Kimbell factors 
are applied to facts to decide when federal common law should be created and when state 
law should govern an issue). 
142 See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (elaborating on the application of these 
factors to legal issues, and explaining what consequences each factor is designed to 
measure). 
143 See supra note 58 (noting the wide array of cases and legal issues to which the Kimbell 
test has been applied). 
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A. Is There a Need for a Federal Uniform Definition of Successor Liability? 
One of the difficulties that many courts face when confronted with 
issues of statutory construction is deciding what Congress would do, or, 
in the alternative, deciding that Congress left it solely to the courts to 
resolve the specific issue.144  The Supreme Court, however, is reluctant to 
fashion federal rules to fill gaps in federal statutes.145  In the context of 
successor liability, a judicial and scholarly debate has continued for more 
than twenty years on this very issue.  In Kimbell, when discussing 
whether uniformity in the administration of a federal program is 
necessary, the Supreme Court suggested that for uniformity to be 
essential, the federal program or Act by its very nature must necessitate 
the creation of uniform rules.146  An additional question to consider is 
whether state law inadequately resolves the question of successor 
liability, thereby necessitating the creation of federal law.147 
Perhaps the strongest argument for creating a federal uniform law in 
this area is Congress’s goal to expedite the litigation of successor liability 
issues.148  In the absence of a uniform federal rule, litigants, attorneys, 
and judges might spend needless resources in resolving liability cases.149  
One goal of CERCLA is to minimize litigation and transaction costs, and 
some circuits have held that this goal is served marginally by a state-by-
state, or case-by-case, approach to determine which law should apply.150  
                                                 
144 United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2005).  In this case, the 
Third Circuit took the latter approach in holding that Congress expected courts to resolve 
the issue by fashioning a federal common law that answered successor liability issues.  Id.  
In Smithland, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a general common law 
doctrine of successor liability administered in most states should be adopted by courts 
rather than specific statutes that apply in a few states.  Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. 
Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91–92 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991) (“a federal court . . . must find . . . that 
Congress painted with a broad brush and left it to the courts to ‘flesh out’ the statute by 
fashioning a body of substantive federal law[] . . . .”). 
145 See supra text accompanying notes 77–78 (discussing the Supreme Court’s caution that 
controversies involving federal programs do not always require the adoption of uniform 
federal rules). 
146 United States v. Kimbell, 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979). 
147 See supra notes 118, 121 and accompanying text (quoting the analysis of the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals of when it is appropriate to apply state law instead of fashioning 
federal common law). 
148 See supra notes 21, 36–37, 89 and accompanying text (considering the amount of 
litigation spawned by CERCLA’s absence of how to resolve successor liability issues, and 
also arguing that a case-by-case approach to resolve the issue in each state would only 
increase the amount of litigation and circumvent CERCLA’s goals). 
149 See supra notes 21, 36 and accompanying text (supporting the notion that CERCLA’s 
silence on the issue of successor liability has led to incalculable amounts of litigation). 
150 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (arguing that a case-by-case approach to 
resolving the issue in each state would only increase the amount of litigation and fail to 
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The creation of a uniform law would avoid this often lengthy process of 
parties arguing over which law governs and would allow parties to 
spend time litigating the more important issue:  who is the appropriate 
successor in interest.151  Because the Supreme Court is weary of 
fashioning new common law, an alternative approach might be for the 
Court to use its interpretive power under Marbury v. Madison, and to 
hold that Congress intended successor liability be enforced under state 
law.152  Without considering possible consequences, this approach 
arguably would avoid the litigation costs and judicial resources currently 
used to decide whether state or federal law should apply.153 
On the contrary, a federal common law rule may not be necessary 
because in most cases, state law adequately determines whom the EPA 
can pursue for compensation, and, as a result, state law achieves 
CERCLA’s purpose of identifying liable parties.154  Furthermore, state 
law does not vary widely on matters of corporate dissolution and 
successor liability; consequently, there is no real need to fashion a law 
that brings all the states into conformity with one another.155  In 
                                                                                                             
satisfy CERCLA’s goals); see also United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294, 300 
(3d Cir. 2005) (“Applying a particular state’s law requires a state-by-state interpretation of 
the federal liability statute—a result, in the case of successor liability under CERCLA, that 
we believe conflicts with the statutory objectives.”). 
151 See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (explaining that CERCLA’s primary goal 
is to remediate contaminated sites promptly). 
152 See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (explaining that CERCLA’s silence on 
the issue manifests an intent to have liable successors determined by the application of 
relevant state law).  But see supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (contending that the 
right to construe a statute is different than the authority to fashion new laws). 
153 But see Smolen, supra note 83, at 148–49. 
[T]he Third Circuit held that applying state successor liability 
standards would lead to increases in both the amount of litigation 
brought under CERCLA and transaction costs.  Moreover, applying 
state law conflicts with the dual policy reasons behind the passage [of] 
CERCLA [] encouraging both early settlement of lawsuits and 
redevelopment of previously contaminated land. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
154 See supra note 132 and accompanying text (arguing that state law furnishes the 
necessary standards to determine who the EPA may consider for compensation of clean-up 
costs, thereby satisfying CERCLA’s objectives).  But see supra notes 88–89 and 
accompanying text (arguing that state law inadequately satisfies CERCLA’s objectives of a 
liquid market in brownfield assets by creating an unpredictable case-by-case approach to 
successor liability.  Instead, it is contended that a uniform and predictable federal standard 
comports with CERCLA’s objective of creating a liquid market in brownfield assets). 
155 See supra note 132 (suggesting that because state law does not vary widely on issues of 
successor liability, there is no need for national uniformity); see also Dennis, supra note 50, 
at 1451 (explaining that laws which govern the piercing of the corporate veil do vary 
among the states).  But see United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294, 301 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (arguing that although state law does not vary widely on the issue, and although 
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summation, the argument is that fashioning a federal law would not 
substantially affect the current process and laws that govern successor 
liability; and, therefore, no real need exists for a federal law in this 
instance.156 
As is apparent, the first prong of the Kimbell test is a difficult hurdle 
over which to leap for those in favor of national uniformity in this area.  
The “need” articulated by the Kimbell court creates a high standard that 
must be met in order to persuade the court to fashion federal common 
law.157  Therefore, the question may be limited to a consideration of 
whether minimizing litigation costs and judicial time meets the 
“necessary” standard articulated in Kimbell.158  However, a further 
question to consider is whether, even if these considerations (minimizing 
litigation costs and judicial time) create a need for federal uniformity and 
the statute is nonetheless judicially construed to apply state law, would 
the need be an imagined phenomenon swallowed up by the interests of 
federalism?159  In contrast, would a decision to adopt a federal standard 
merely be an exercise of filling definitional gaps (“successor 
corporation”) in a hastily enacted statute, rather than the “free-wheeling 
creation of federal common law[?]”160  Additionally, even if a need for 
                                                                                                             
successor liability involves aspects of tort and corporate law, both of which are generally 
matters of state law, the seeming state-by-state uniformity is less apparent when applied to 
specific cases).  Id.  The Third Circuit also cited several examples of how small and subtle 
legal nuances on successor liability issues create differences when applied in different 
states:  New York and other states emphasize “continuity of ownership” as a factor of 
successor liability, while other states do not; some states, including Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey, apply unique successor liability doctrines in environmental cases, while other states 
do not; in some states, the rules governing liability are ambiguous and are not applied 
uniformly; and, finally, even states and jurisdictions that generally agree on which legal 
doctrines are appropriate to apply, administer them differently.  Id. at 301–02 n.6. 
156 See supra notes 118–21, 131 and accompanying text (contending that the instances are 
few and restricted in which federal law should be created and applied, and state law 
adequately resolves the issue of successor liability, thereby quashing the need for federal 
uniformity that some courts argue is mandated in the realm of successor liability under 
CERCLA).  But see United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (E.D. Mo. 1987).  
Supporting the creation of federal law, the court held that federal law should be created in 
order for the issue of successor liability to be resolved meeting CERCLA’s objectives.  Id.  
The court reasoned that the application of the state standards might not preclude further 
litigation on the issue, and the possibility of different state standards might lead to 
inconsistent results.  Id. 
157 See supra notes 141–43 (reviewing some of the standards considered in determining 
whether the creation of a federal law is necessary). 
158 See supra note 122 (explaining that CERCLA does not require application of federal 
law unless state law would be inconsistent with CERCLA’s stated purposes). 
159 See Warren, supra note 3, at 326 (supporting the idea that arguments in favor of the 
application of state law have their roots in federalism). 
160 United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that 
recent Supreme Court cases have not filled in gaps of federal liability statutes with the law 
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federal uniformity exists, a final inquiry becomes whether the 
application of state law sufficiently resolves the need.161 
B. Would the Application of State Law Disrupt the Specific Purposes of 
CERCLA? 
As discussed in Part II.A, Congress had the following two purposes 
in enacting CERCLA:  1) to allow the EPA to quickly pursue recovery 
costs from parties liable for clean-up activities at a hazardous site; and 2) 
to identify and actually remediate contaminated sites.162  CERCLA’s 
legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended for its purposes 
to be fulfilled promptly by cleaning up hazardous waste sites quickly.163  
One author argues that CERCLA is a remediation statute intended to 
impose liability on parties for past actions that have caused present 
consequences.164  Therefore, the ultimate decision to apply state or 
federal law must consider these purposes and not prohibit them from 
prompt accomplishment.165 
Proponents of state law argue that CERCLA’s purposes are 
accomplished by the application of state law:  a liable party can be 
identified through the application of state corporate liability laws.166  
However, the concern remains as to whether state law will continue to 
satisfy CERLCA’s purposes.167 
                                                                                                             
of an individual state; rather, the Court has filled the statutory gaps with general common 
law principles); supra notes 77, 135 (emphasizing the statutory gaps present in CERCLA). 
161 See supra Part III.A (discussing whether the application of State Law to resolve the 
issue of successor liability satisfies CERCLA’s specific objectives). 
162 See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text (citing the purposes and Congressional 
intent for enacting CERCLA). 
163 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (emphasizing that CERCLA was enacted to 
combat the growing concerns over the environmental and health risks created by the 
disposal of hazardous waste and that Congress intended to have hazardous waste sites 
promptly remediated). 
164 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (citing one author who explained CERCLA, 
as a backward-looking Act, and seeking to remediate past events of contamination that 
have created present consequences). 
165 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (discussing the Kimbell factors and their 
utility in deciding whether state or federal law would meet a federal policy’s objectives); see 
also Clarke, supra note 32, at 1312 (“‘One can hardly imagine a federal program more 
demanding of national uniformity than environmental protection.’ . . . [U]niform 
enforcement of CERCLA is especially necessary because hazardous sites often present 
problems and dangers that cross state lines and demand remedial attention at the federal 
level.”) (footnote omitted). 
166 See supra note 111 and accompanying text (citing an example of how state corporate 
liability laws can be used to find responsible parties in successor liability cases under 
CERCLA, and arguing that state liability laws are largely uniform among the fifty states). 
167 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (citing one instance where state law is 
inadequate to resolve issues of successor liability). 
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The legislative history and the holdings of several circuits reflect that 
CERCLA’s purposes would not be fulfilled in the absence of federal 
uniformity, reasoning that such silence in this area could lead to states 
creating more lenient laws to attract business, and consequently, could 
create a “race to the bottom” for states and a “safe haven” for 
polluters.168  More specifically, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
reasoned that CERCLA’s purposes and goals could be subverted by a 
liable party’s decision to merge under the laws of states that restrict the 
possibility of successor liability.169 
In contrast to this view, circuits opposed to a federal law in this area 
generally reason that a “race to the bottom” will not result and that 
different states will not create “safe havens.”170  This view is supported 
by the fact that presently no state law can genuinely be characterized as 
creating a safe haven.171  Additionally, it is argued that all states have 
their own interest in being certain that successor corporations do not 
avoid successor liability.172  Furthermore, many states have agencies 
                                                 
168 See supra notes 67, 76, 116, 120–21 and accompanying text (arguing that federal 
uniformity comports with Congress’s desire to prohibit polluters from establishing their 
operations in states that have more lenient liability laws).  See also Clarke, supra note 32, at 
1312–13.  Clarke stated: 
Several courts finding a need for uniform enforcement of 
CERCLA have noted that an important consideration leading to 
[CERCLA’s] enactment was the failure of the states to respond 
adequately to hazardous waste problems[] . . . [and]  
. . . that district courts “must consider national uniformity” to 
prevent the unduly restrictive successor liability laws of particular 
states from frustrating CERCLA’s goals. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
169 See supra note 80 and accompanying text (citing Smithland, where the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that a federal uniform standard should be adopted to prevent 
CERCLA’s objectives from being circumvented by a party choosing to merge or 
incorporate in a state with laws that unnecessarily restrict successor liability). 
170 See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text (arguing that creation of a “race to the 
bottom” or “safe havens” is not a valid concern because states have an interest in 
protecting human health and the environment). 
171 See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 364 
(9th Cir. 1997); see also Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1502 
(11th Cir. 1996). 
172 See Atchison, 159 F.3d at 364.  See also Redwing Carriers, Inc., 94 F.3d at 1502, stating: 
States have a substantial interest in protecting their citizens and state 
resources.  Most states have their own counterparts to CERCLA and 
the EPA and they share a complementary interest with the United 
States in enforcement of laws like CERCLA that are used to remedy 
environmental contamination.  I see no necessity to create federal 
common law in this area, to guard against the risk that states will 
create safe havens. 
Id. (quoting Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
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analogous to the EPA that are authorized to deal with hazardous waste 
sites, which further ensures that a race to the bottom is not as inevitable 
as some might suppose.173  Therefore, the notion is that cleaning up 
hazardous waste sites is not a unique federal interest, and states have 
quieted any perceived need for federal uniformity by creating state 
agencies that promote remedial efforts to clean up hazardous waste 
sites.174 
One additional objective of CERCLA, however, is to facilitate a more 
liquid market in “brownfield” assets.175  Some proponents of a federal 
law have urged that this purpose is best served by uniform and 
predictable standards and that unpredictability as to which law to apply 
would only complicate and increase the costs of “brownfield” 
transactions.176  In sum, a uniform law in this area could give to 
corporations and investors, purchasing a property that potentially 
contains hazardous waste, security as to which law will apply if waste is 
found and liability is investigated.177 
Having considered the need for federal uniformity and whether state 
law can satisfy any need for uniformity, the final inquiry is whether a 
federal rule would frustrate corporate relationships.178  
C. Would the Adoption of a Federal Rule Frustrate Commercial Relationships 
Established Under State Law? 
This is a difficult inquiry because the “consequences of the rule and 
the degree of disruption, if any, would depend on the substantive 
content of the rule, not on its mere existence.”179  Although some courts 
                                                 
173 See id. 
174 Id.; see also Dennis, supra note 50, at 1501–02 (“Claims that adoption of state law would 
lead to the creation of “safe havens for polluters and would quickly exhaust the Superfund 
were shown to be too speculative to meet the evidentiary standards established in other 
cases.”). 
175 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing that a uniform federal rule would 
help facilitate Congress’s economic interest in creating a more liquid market in 
“brownfield” assets). 
176 See supra note 88 (discussing that some of the statutory objectives of CERCLA are to 
encourage the clean-up, transfer, and redevelopment of contaminated sites); see also Polius 
v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Unforeseeable alterations in successor 
liability principles complicate transfers and necessarily increases [sic] transaction costs.  
Major economic decisions, critical to society, are best made in a climate of relative certainty 
and reasonable predictability.”) (citation omitted). 
177 But see Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1502 (11th Cir. 
1996) (explaining that due to the popularity of limited partnerships, investors’ expectations 
may be upset by the adoption of a federal rule). 
178 See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing whether the adoption of a federal rule would frustrate 
commercial relationships created under state law). 
179 See Clarke, supra note 32, at 1313.  But see id. 
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have held that this factor supports the adoption of state law, many have 
failed to address extensively its implications when applied to the 
successor liability problem.180  One author commented that the 
application of a state’s law of incorporation to external issues could 
result in difficult problems, such as if a case involved several 
corporations incorporated in different states.181  Under these 
circumstances, a corporation has no guarantee that the successor liability 
laws in its state of incorporation will govern successor liability issues—a 
guarantee and predictability that any corporation is entitled to and 
would receive with a federal standard.182  In addition to concerns about 
lack of predictability, outside of the CERCLA issue, some courts have 
held that the frustration of commercial relationships based on state law 
may result in a variety of ways.183 
This discussion will be considered in light of three factors considered 
by some courts.184  First, Part III.C.1 discusses whether commercial 
relationships are disrupted when a corporation anticipated that an issue 
was to be governed by state law.185  Second, Part III.C.2 analyzes whether 
disruption of commercial relationships will result once a federal 
standard has been widely applied.186  Third, Part III.C.3 considers 
whether commercial relationships would be disrupted by the 
uncertainty that newly fashioned federal common law creates.187 
                                                                                                             
Even if a uniform federal rule of successor liability had a greater effect 
on the business community than expected, CERCLA’s legislative 
history reveals that Congress was far more concerned with the 
substantial threats to human health and the environment posed by the 
national hazardous waste disposal problem than it was with 
disrupting commercial relationships based on state law. 
Id. 
180 See generally Redwing Carriers, Inc., 94 F.3d at 1502 (arguing that creation of a federal 
law would frustrate “the expectations investors have under current state law rules . . . .”). 
181 Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil:  The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863 (1982); see also supra note 136 (explaining why some problems 
exist when CERCLA issues cross state-lines). 
182 Dennis, supra note 50, at 1502–03. 
183 See supra note 58 (discussing three ways that courts have held that frustration of 
commercial relationships based on state law can result). 
184 The questions and cases discussed in this Part were first considered in Dennis, supra 
note 50. 
185 See infra notes 187–91 and accompanying text (discussing and applying a choice-of-
law Supreme Court case that considered whether commercial relationships are disrupted 
when an entity anticipated that an issue was to be governed by state law). 
186 See infra notes 192–97 and accompanying text (considering and applying a choice-of-
law Ninth Circuit case to the question of whether disruption of commercial relationships 
will result when a federal law has been widely applied). 
187 See infra notes 198–201 and accompanying text (discussing and applying a Ninth 
Circuit case to the present issue of successor liability in the context of whether commercial 
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1. Are Commercial Relationships Disrupted When a Corporation 
Anticipated That an Issue Was To Be Governed by State Law? 
First, courts have considered the disruption of commercial 
relationships in actions taken before the adoption of a federal rule when 
a corporation has anticipated that the issue would be handled by state 
law.188  For example, the Supreme Court in United States v. Brosnan 
refused to create a federal rule dealing with federal tax liens being 
nullified in the foreclosure proceedings of a particular state.189  The Court 
reasoned that although uniformity could be beneficial to the federal 
government, allowing state law to govern foreclosure proceedings 
would be more consistent with Congress’s previous actions.190 
As applied to the issue at hand, if a federal law governing successor 
liability was created, an investor, stockholder, or corporation who 
invested in a corporate body or transaction before the federal law was 
created would not have had the opportunity to contemplate his potential 
liability under the federal law.191  In short, an investor or parent 
corporation might be held liable unfairly if a federal standard is different 
than the standard contemplated when the investment was made.192 
2. Will Disruption of Commercial Relationships Result Once a Federal 
Standard Has Been Widely Applied? 
Second, courts have considered the disruption of commercial 
relationships that might result from the effects the rule will have after it 
becomes well-known and widely applied.193  For example, in United 
States v. Hadden Haciendas Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals created 
a federal rule that permitted post-foreclosure actions for damages.194  The 
                                                                                                             
relationships would be disrupted by the resultant uncertainty that a new federal law would 
create). 
188 Dennis, supra note 50, at 1503. 
189 363 U.S. 237, 241–42 (1960).  See also Dennis, supra note 50, at 1503.  Dennis noted that 
the Kimbell Court cited Brosnan as just one authority for the third factor in the Kimbell test.  
Id.; see United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729 n.24 (1979). 
190 Brosnan, 363 U.S. at 242.  Additionally, the Court gave the following reasons for 
choosing to adopt state law:  “Long accepted nonjudicial means of enforcing private liens 
would be embarrassed[] . . . and many titles already secured by such means would be cast 
in doubt.”  Id.; see also Dennis, supra note 50, at 1503. 
191 Dennis, supra note 50, at 1506.  The author also argues that “creditors who finance a 
parent corporation will now have to concern themselves with the parent’s liability for 
damages incurred by the subsidiary.”  Id. at 1507. 
192 Id.  This represents an unforeseen risk that the creditor did not have to consider when 
she originally financed the parent corporation.  Id. at 1507. 
193 Id. at 1504. 
194 541 F.2d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Dennis, supra note 50, at 1504 n.592. 
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court reasoned that the federal law did not overly intrude on state laws 
protecting debtors because the necessary protection contemplated by 
state statutes would be achieved by application of a federal rule and the 
federal program.195 
In the context of successor liability, a uniform rule would help serve 
CERCLA’s remedial purposes of identifying potentially liable parties 
and increasing the liquid market in “brownfield” assets.196  In the long 
run, this would benefit both states and individuals by allowing them to 
predict how liable parties will be identified, and it might also increase 
the rate at which hazardous property is cleaned up, redeveloped, or 
transferred.197  However, although the creation of federal law might meet 
states’ and CERCLA’s expectations in cleaning up hazardous waste, no 
specific federal policy would be compromised by applying the laws of 
the individual states.198 
3. Would Commercial Relationships Be Disrupted By the Uncertainty 
Newly Fashioned Federal Common Law Creates? 
Third, courts have considered the uncertainty caused by the 
adoption and application of a new federal law.199  For example, in 1986 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated two concerns that a 
federal rule might present to litigants applying a newly fashioned federal 
law.  The concern most relevant to the issue of successor liability is 
whether the application of a new federal rule—in place of applying a 
fully defined and established state law—could create uncertainty about 
how the rule is applied in a specific set of circumstances.200 
In CERCLA’s world of successor liability, the confusion will most 
likely be temporary while federal courts try to apply the new federal 
law.201  Although some argue that creation of a federal law will bring 
                                                 
195 Hadden Haciendas, 541 F.2d at 785. 
196 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (explaining how a federal rule would 
help facilitate a more liquid market in brownfield assets, and thereby satisfy CERCLA and 
its amendment’s purposes). 
197 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing the objectives of the 2001 
Amendments to CERCLA and the relevance of “brownfield” assets, and explaining that 
one of CERCLA’s goals is to reduce litigation and transaction costs). 
198 See supra notes 122,153 and accompanying text (explaining that no federal policy 
would be compromised by the application of state law).  But see supra note 89 (arguing that 
CERCLA’s objectives of lowering litigation costs is poorly served by a case-by-case 
approach to the question of successor liability); note 67 (arguing that more lenient state 
laws would disrupt the federal policy behind enacting CERCLA). 
199 Dennis, supra note 50, at 1505. 
200 See id. at 1505–06 (citing Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1460 (9th 
Cir. 1986)). 
201 Id. at 1510–11. 
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predictability to the realm of successor liability, others maintain that the 
confusion will only start anew and continue until a large enough body of 
case law exists such that litigants can predict confidently how a federal 
court will apply the law to a particular set of circumstances.202  In 
addition to these concerns and approaches, other concerns and 
arguments remain as to which law should apply. 
IV.  A NEED FOR UNIFORMITY 
The arguments both for application of state law and those for 
application of federal law are persuasive.203  And yet, need for national 
uniformity is apparent from the declared purposes of CERCLA and in 
order to avoid the continued confusion and unpredictability that 
differences in state law create.204  Therefore, this Note proposes that the 
confusion must be alleviated in one of three ways.205  First, Congress 
could resolve the issue through a statutory amendment that clearly states 
how a successor corporation is to be determined for purposes of 
liability.206  Second, if the Supreme Court determines that Congress will 
continue to remain silent, it could use its authority to construe the Act 
and clearly define what Congress intended a “corporation” to mean.207  
Finally, if it is apparent that mere statutory construction will 
inadequately resolve the issue, uniform federal common law should be 
created to clearly outline how a successor corporation is to be 
determined.208 
                                                 
202 See supra notes 88 and 176 and accompanying text (explaining that predictability is a 
desirable trait of a federal law in this area).  But see Dennis, supra note 50, at 1510–11 
(discussing the temporary confusion that will continue to plague corporations and 
investors if a federal law is adopted). 
203 See supra Parts II.D–III (discussing the histories and arguments for application of state 
law and application of federal law). 
204 See supra Part III (analyzing the various arguments for application of state law and 
federal law, and considering the reasons why fashioning a federal rule in the realm of 
successor liability is superior to the case-by-case approach of applying state law). 
205 See infra Part IV.B.  Mere statutory construction can be difficult to separate fully from 
the fashioning of federal common law in the realm of successor liability due to the specific 
language that must be included to define how a successor corporation is to be determined 
under CERCLA.  See infra Part IV.B. 
206 See infra Part IV.A (proposing a statutory amendment to define how a successor 
corporation is to be determined under CERCLA, and considering how such an amendment 
would resolve the issue of successor liability). 
207 See infra Part IV.B (proposing statutory construction as an option to resolving the issue 
of successor liability). 
208 See infra Part IV.C (proposing that the Supreme Court resolve the issue by creating a 
uniform approach to determining who is a successor corporation under CERCLA). 
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A. Proposed Amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 9607 of CERCLA 
Congress could amend section 9607 of CERCLA to define 
“corporation” as follows: 
(5) For purposes of liability, “any person” as used in this 
section includes successors to any corporate entity that is 
subject to liability.  Where the facts are in dispute as to 
whether a corporation is truly a successor to a liable party, a 
“successor corporation” shall be determined by the following 
factors:  “(1) retention of the same employees [by the 
buyer]; (2) retention of the same supervisory personnel; 
(3) retention of the same production facilities in the same 
location; (4) production of the same product; (5) 
retention of the same name; (6) continuity of assets; (7) 
continuity of general business operations; and (8) 
whether the buyer holds itself out as a continuation of 
the” divesting corporation.209 
Commentary 
This problem that could easily be fixed if Congress decided to 
resolve the issue and amend CERCLA to state clearly which law should 
govern or, alternatively, to indicate clearly how “person” is to be defined 
under the courts’ term “successor corporation.”210  Unfortunately, 
however, CERCLA was enacted in 1980, and its progeny—the 1986 and 
2000 Amendments—were silent as to the issue of successor liability.  
Consequently, if the issue is to be resolved, the Court should assume the 
responsibility because Congress has had nearly twenty-eight years to 
amend CERCLA with a clear definition of “successor corporation,” but 
has failed to do so.  Obviously, this is the fastest and, arguably, the least 
controversial method of resolving the conflict.  However, in summary, 
absent any indication that an amendment to CERCLA is forthcoming, 
the Court should assume the responsibility of resolving the issue. 
B. Supreme Court Construction of “Successor Corporation” 
The Supreme Court could construe CERCLA to define how a 
“successor corporation” is to be determined: 
                                                 
209 The text appearing in normal font represents language taken from the First Circuit’s 
opinion in United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 53 (1st Cir. 2001).  The text appearing in italics 
represents the proposed amendment of the author of this Note. 
210 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (explaining that although Congress did 
not include “successor corporation” in the definition of “person,” federal circuit courts 
have interpreted “corporation” to include “successor corporation”). 
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Corporation[s],” included under 42 U.S.C. § 9601, which are 
liable for clean-up costs of contaminated sites, include the 
following:  the current owner of a site on which remedial 
action is necessary when a responsible party cannot be found 
and the owner of a site at the time the hazardous waste 
was disposed of.  Additionally, where the responsible party 
is a defunct corporation, the Act is interpreted to include any 
“corporation” that is a successor-in-interest, successor-in-
business, or successor-in-assets to the defunct corporation.211 
Commentary 
This proposed judicial construction might alleviate some of the 
confusion in determining who a successor corporation is.  Unfortunately, 
this interpretation may be too ambiguous to give courts enough 
direction when determining successor corporations in every instance.  
Additionally, a larger difficulty remains with the premise that the 
Court’s authority to construe a statute is very different than its authority 
to create a new federal rule.212  Some commentators have argued that the 
Court could easily define “successor corporation” without creating 
federal common law.213  However, if federal courts are to define 
“successor corporation” rather than apply state law or create common 
law, the holding must not be so broad that it abuses the courts power to 
construe statutes by creating definitions that are in themselves whole 
new laws. 
Therefore, under the separation of powers doctrine, while statutory 
construction might be more acceptable than fashioning federal common 
law, any definition might be too narrow and leave continued ambiguity 
causing parties to litigate, thereby violating one of CERCLA’s purposes 
that an amendment or interpretation is meant to correct—reducing 
litigation costs.  In short, an acceptable interpretation to resolve the issue 
may be too broad to simply be characterized as construing CERCLA. 
                                                 
211 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2000).  The text appearing in normal font represents language that 
was adapted from dicta in the Third Circuit’s opinion Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. 
Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1988).  The text appearing in italics represents the 
proposed interpretation of the author of this Note. 
212 See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between 
statutory construction and the creation of federal rules). 
213 See supra text accompanying note 87 (citing the Third Circuit’s holding that creation of 
a federal rule would constitute statutory interpretation and not the creation of federal 
common law). 
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C. Judicially Created Common Law Defining “Sucessor Corporation” 
The Supreme Court could create federal common law that clearly 
defines how a “successor corporation” is to be determined: 
The circuit courts in favor of federal common law have 
adopted the “substantial continuation” test as the appropriate 
uniform federal standard.  After concluding that adoption of a 
uniform federal standard is what Congress intended, we see no 
reason why the “substantial continuation” test should not be 
adopted as that standard.  As such, when determining whether 
a corporation is liable as a successor in liability for clean-up 
costs on a contaminated waste site, courts should analyze the 
facts in light of the following eight factors:  “(1) retention of 
the same employees [by the buyer]; (2) retention of the 
same supervisory personnel; (3) retention of the same 
production facilities in the same location; (4) production 
of the same product; (5) retention of the same name; (6) 
continuity of assets; (7) continuity of general business 
operations; and (8) whether the buyer holds itself out as 
a continuation of the” divesting corporation.214 
Commentary 
Although this might be the least favorable alternative, it is probably 
the most likely and reasonable.  The “substantial continuation” test has 
been applied in many cases already.  Therefore, fears that a new 
common law would only create confusion of application until a large 
number of cases have been decided are somewhat unfounded.  
Furthermore, determining successor corporations can require an 
extremely fact-sensitive analysis.  Therefore, the proposed test gives 
courts the ability to analyze cases consistently, based on a variety of 
factors, and in spite of varying facts. 
Additionally, as previously discussed, the stated purposes of 
CERCLA are to promptly pursue recovery costs, to identify and 
remediate contaminated sites, and to minimize litigation and transaction 
costs in identifying potentially responsible parties.215  Also, CERCLA’s 
sponsor indicated that one of its primary purposes is to ensure the 
creation of a uniform rule of law to mitigate the possibility of businesses 
                                                 
214 The text appearing in normal font represents language taken from the First Circuit’s 
opinion in United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 53 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).  The text 
appearing in italics represents the proposed judicial holding of the author of this Note. 
215 See generally supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes for 
which CERCLA was enacted). 
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locating in states that are “safe havens” for pollution.216  In consideration 
of these purposes, the benefits of the proposed uniform test become even 
more apparent.217 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although the application of State X’s or State Y’s law might be able 
to resolve the hypothetical presented in Part I of this Note, the adequacy 
of their ability to also meet CERCLA’s specific objectives is questionable.  
Additionally, the difference in corporate liability laws between State X 
(more lenient laws) and State Y (more strict laws) creates an additional 
hurdle for the federal court to consider when deciding which law should 
govern the issue.  Indeed, the creation of a federal rule as discussed in 
Part IV has a greater likelihood of satisfying CERCLA’s various purposes 
while also giving the federal court in the hypothetical in Part I a uniform, 
widely applied, and predictable approach to determining whether E 
Corp. is a successor in interest.  Furthermore, a uniform rule would allow 
E Corp. and the government to avoid the unnecessary cost of litigating to 
determine which law should apply in a specific scenario:  federal law, 
State X’s law, or State Y’s law.  The result of adopting a uniform standard 
is that the federal court would be emboldened to resolve hastily the 
greatest issue:  who will pay for the clean-up costs of the contaminated 
facilities? 
The different approaches to adopting a federal rule introduced in 
Part IV of this Note would each have a greater likelihood of resolving 
who is liable in a successor liability case.  Specifically, the second 
approach in Part IV.B, which advocates statutory construction, is less 
likely to resolve the issue because further ambiguity would remain as to 
how a successor is to be determined.  Alternatively, the first and third 
approaches in Parts IV.A and IV.C clearly define factors to consider 
when determining who is a liable successor to contaminated property.  
However, this being the case, any of the three approaches discussed in 
Part IV would resolve issues of never-ending litigation to determine 
which law is the applicable standard.  Specifically, each approach as 
applied to the hypothetical would eliminate litigation to decide which 
law applies, and each party would arrive at the judge’s bench ready to 
argue the facts as applied to a predictable standard, thereby expediting 
the process of determining who is liable for cleaning up a contaminated 
site—the ultimate purpose of CERCLA. 
                                                 
216 See supra note 116 and accompanying text (citing Representative Florio’s discussion of 
CERCLA’s primary objectives). 
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In summary, the predictability of a federal common law and the 
ability of a uniform law to satisfy CERCLA’s objectives make it a superior 
choice to the application of state law.  Among the many stated reasons 
for a uniform rule, analysis of the issue using the Kimbell test further 
substantiates that uniform law is the appropriate choice.218  First, the 
need for federal common law to resolve the issue is clear.  The 
application of state law would not encourage early settlement of 
lawsuits, whereas uniformity would expedite the process because 
litigation time would not be wasted in determining who is a “successor 
corporation.”  Additionally, state law would not facilitate the prompt 
redevelopment of brownfield sites.  Both of these reasons are purposes 
for which CERCLA was enacted. 
Second, state law would disrupt the specific purposes of CERCLA.  
Application of state law could create a future “race to the bottom” 
among states that create lenient laws to attract business.219  Additionally, 
state law is often inadequate to address problems of hazardous waste 
that cross state lines and require federal intervention for complete 
resolution.  Finally, state law could inhibit the prompt redevelopment of 
brownfield sites, due to the unpredictability that corporations would 
face in determining which law would govern if they were involved in a 
lawsuit seeking to identify a potentially responsible party. 
Third, a federal rule would not frustrate commercial relationships 
founded upon state law.  Any challenge that might be created would 
only be temporary.  Confusion would remain until a large enough body 
of law existed such that corporations could predict how the courts would 
apply the federal standard.  Nevertheless, this temporary confusion is 
preferable to the restrictive state laws that would alternatively govern 
the issue and, consequently, frustrate CERCLA’s main goals. 
A consideration of the issue under the Kimbell factors ensures that 
creation of federal law to resolve the issue of successor liability has the 
highest potential for meeting CERCLA’s objectives.  Accordingly, federal 
                                                 
218 See supra Parts III.A–C (examining the Kimbell factors as applied to the issue of 
successor liability under CERCLA to decide whether federal law should be adopted rather 
applying state law). 
219 See supra note 168 and accompanying text (arguing that CERCLA’s legislative history 
and several circuits’ holdings reflect that the absence of federal uniformity would cause 
states to enact more lenient laws to stimulate their economies). 
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common law has the greatest possibility of remedying a deficiency in a 
statute that could be resolved by the creation of a rule that is uniform 
and predictable. 
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